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This Article examines the challenges global climate change presents for the
Endangered Species Act (ESA) and its primary administrative agency, the U.S.
Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS). Climate change will reshuffle ecological
systems in ways that will defy prediction using existing knowledge and models,
posing threats to species through primary and secondary ecological effects
and the effects of human adaptation to climate change. Even assuming global-
wide regulation of greenhouse gas emissions eventually yields a more stable
climate variation regime, it will differ from the recent historical regime and
many species will not survive the transition regardless of human interventions
using the ESA. Yet many other species can survive with the assistance offered
through a focused application of the ESA.
This Article proposes a policy approach aimed toward that objective. It
begins by introducing the climate change challenge facing the FWS and
explains why, after the Supreme Court's decision in Massachusetts v. EPA, the
agency must develop a response. Part I examines the likely ecological
consequences of climate change, for which we have no analog, and develops a
typology of threats species will experience. Part II explores the pressures
climate change will place on the FWS's policy decisions as an escalating
number of species faces increasingly more serious imperilment as a result of
climate change. Part III methodically probes the relevant provisions of the
ESA to identify the range of policy discretion the FWS has in making those
decisions. Part IV then lays out a plan for the FWS to use the ESA to build
bridges for climate-threatened species across the climate change transition
and into the no-analog future. Most significantly, I propose that the ESA
should not be used to regulate greenhouse gas emissions, but rather that it
should be focused on establishing protective measures for species that have a
chance of surviving the climate change transition and establishing a viable
population in the future climate regime. In particular, the ESA can help
ensure that human adaptation to climate change does not prevent other species
from adapting as well.
INTRODUCTION
The pika is toast. More specifically, the American pika (Ochotona
princeps) is running out of places to live,1 and global climate change appears
to be the primary cause of its decline.2 This tiny rabbit-like species has the
1 The background on the pika in this paragraph is derived from Donald K. Grayson, A
Brief History of Great Basin Pikas, 32 J. BIOGEOGRAPHY 2103 (2005), and Erik A. Beever et
al., Patterns of Apparent Extirpation Among Isolated Populations of Pikas (Ochotona
princeps) in the Great Basin, 84 J. MAMMALOGY 37 (2003). For numerous images of pikas
in their montane habitat, enter "pika" in Google Images.
2 In this Article, I unapologetically adopt the premise that global climate change is
occurring at anomalously rapid rates compared to historical trends, and that anthropogenic
(human-induced) sources of greenhouse gases (primarily carbon dioxide) are a significant
[Vol. 88:1
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unfortunate trait of being remarkably well-adapted to the cold, high-altitude,
montane habitat of the Sierra Nevada and Rocky Mountain ranges in the North
American Great Basin. Indeed, it is considered one of the iconic species to
causal factor. I do not endeavor here to convince anyone of this. The Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), an international scientific project representing hundreds
of scientists, has produced a series of reports, including a comprehensive set in 2007,
synthesizing scientific information on climate change and its effects on ecological
conditions, all of which support the premises adopted herein. See, e.g.,
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS, CLIMATE
CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP I TO THE
FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 2-5
(2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wgl/ar4-wgl-spm.pdf
[hereinafter PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS SUMMARY]; INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE
CHANGE, SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION
AND VULNERABILITY, CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP II TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT
REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 8-10 (2007), available at
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg2/ar4-wg2-spm.pdf [hereinafter CLIMATE
CHANGE IMPACTS SUMMARY]; INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE,
SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: MITIGATION, CONTRIBUTION OF
WORKING GROUP III TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL
PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGEpassim (2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-
report/ar4/wg3/ar4-wg3-spm.pdf [hereinafter MITIGATION SUMMARY];
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE AND BIODIVERSITY,
IPCC TECHNICAL PAPER V, at 1 (2002), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/technical-
papers/climate-changes-biodiversity-en.pdf [hereinafter CLIMATE CHANGE AND
BIODIVERSITY]. The IPCC recently summarized its work to date in INTERGOVERNMENTAL
PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007 SYNTHESIS REPORT: SUMMARY FOR
POLICY MAKERS (2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-
report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr_spm.pdf [hereinafter 2007 SYNTHESIS REPORT SUMMARY].
To be sure, the IPCC reports recognize a substantial degree of uncertainty about climate
change cause and effect in many respects, which I cover where relevant infra. There are
also many sources of commentary about climate change taking positions contrary to those
adopted in the IPCC reports and in this Article, suggesting that climate change is not
occurring, or that if it is occurring, it is a natural and temporary cycle of climate variation.
See, e.g., C.D. IDSO & K.E. IDSO, CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF CARBON DIOXIDE & GLOBAL
CHANGE, CARBON DIOXIDE AND GLOBAL WARMING: WHERE WE STAND ON THE ISSUE (1998),
available at http://www.co2science.org/scripts/CO2ScienceB2C/about/position/
globalwarming.jsp. On the other hand, there are also many scientists who believe the IPCC
has been too cautious in communicating the potential severity of climate change and its
effects. See Chris Huntingford & Jason Lowe, "Overshoot" Scenarios and Climate
Change, 316 SCIENCE 829, 830 (2007); Richard A. Kerr, Pushing the Scary Side of Climate
Change, 316 SCIENCE 1412, 1412 (2007). Being the product of international consensus,
moreover, it is widely regarded that the assessments in the IPCC reports were "watered
down." What the Climate Panel Didn 't Say, ENVTL. F., May-June 2007, at 20, 20. Ongoing
research that the federal government's Climate Change Science Program (CCSP) conducts,
as well as U.S. government involvement in the IPCC project, is covered at
http://www.climatescience.gov (last visited Nov. 14, 2007).
HeinOnline  -- 88 B.U. L. Rev.  3 2008
BOSTON UNIVERSITY LA WREVIEW
people who enjoy climbing in high elevations - it even has its own fan club.
3
The pika's problem is that as global climate change causes surface
temperatures to rise, the altitude above which pikas can find suitable
conditions for survival also is rising. In Yosemite National Park, for example,
researchers have determined that the minimum average altitude for pika
populations has risen from 7800 feet to 9500 feet in the past 90 years. Of
course, if you think of a mountainous topography, you can quickly appreciate
the pika's problem - most remaining pika populations are now stranded on
scattered high mountain peaks in ranges separated by low-lying deserts,
meaning they are stuck on mountaintop islands and the water is rising, so to
speak. Seven of the twenty-five historically described pika populations in the
Great Basin have gone extinct, and those remaining are in decline.
4
The pika's recent decline and gloomy future call to mind the protective
capacity of the Endangered Species Act (ESA).5 Often referred to as the "pit
bull" of environmental laws,6 the ESA erects a powerful framework for the
identification and conservation of endangered and threatened species. 7 The
United States Fish & Wildlife Service (FWS), which administers the ESA for
3 See Enthusiasts Mailing List at Pika *Works, http://www.pikaworks.com/
services/enthusiasts.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2007).
4 See Grayson, supra note 1, at 2103.
5 Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (codified as
amended at 7 U.S.C. § 136 (2000), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2000), and in other scattered
sections of 16 U.S.C.). The pika is not currently protected under the ESA. In October 2007,
the Center for Biological Diversity petitioned the federal government to extend ESA
protection to the pika on the basis of climate change impacts. See Petition to List the
American Pika (Ochotona Princeps) as Threatened or Endangered Under the Endangered
Species Act, at 1 (Oct. 1, 2007), available at http://www.biologicaldiversity.org/
species/mammals/American-pika/pdfs/American-pika-federal-petition- 10-01 -2007.pdf.
6 See, e.g., Steven P. Quarles, The Pit Bull Goes to School, ENVTL. F., Sep.-Oct. 1998, at
55, 55 (discussing the origins of this reputation). For additional historical context
highlighting the Act's "overbearing statutory certainty," see generally Steven P. Quarles &
Thomas R. Lundquist, The Pronounced Presence and Insistent Issues of the ESA, NAT.
RESOURCES & ENv'T, Fall 2001, at 59.
7 This Article is not intended to provide a comprehensive overview of the ESA. Rather,
it focuses on the manner in which global climate change will influence administration of the
ESA. For comprehensive treatments of the ESA, several of which are referred to frequently
infra, see generally MICHAEL J. BEAN & MELANIE J. ROWLAND, THE EVOLUTION OF
NATIONAL WILDLIFE LAW (3d ed. 1997); ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: LAW, POLICY, AND
PERSPECTIVES (Donald C. Baur & Wm. Robert Irvin eds., 2002) [hereinafter LAW, POLICY,
AND PERSPECTIVES]; LAWRENCE R. LIEBESMAN & RAFE PETERSEN, ENDANGERED SPECIES
DESKBOOK (2003); STANFORD ENVTL. LAW SoC'Y, THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT (2001);
TONY A. SULLINS. ESA: ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT (2001); THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT
AT THIRTY: RENEWING THE CONSERVATION PROMISE: VOLUME 1 (Dale D. Goble et al. eds.,
2006) [hereinafter THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT AT THIRTY].
[Vol. 88:1
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terrestrial and freshwater species,8 has identified over 1250 animal and plant
species in the United States for protection and has exercised its regulatory
authority throughout the nation to fulfill the statute's goal of conserving
imperiled species.9 While few species brought under the ESA's protection
have recovered to full health, the ESA is credited with preventing the ultimate
extinction of the vast majority of protected species.10
Given the threat climate change poses to the pika and potentially many other
species - one preeminent ecologist describes climate change as "a major threat
to the survival of species and integrity of ecosystems world-wide",I - it seems
an appropriate target for the ESA. Indeed, although clearly not enthusiastic
about the prospect, the FWS appears ready to carry the ESA into the climate
change era, having recently proposed to extend ESA protection to the polar
bear because of the diminishing ice habitat that the species depends upon for
survival.' 2 The agency is getting strong nudges from the outside as well, as
members of Congress have urged the agency to evaluate the effects of climate
change on species generally,' 3 environmental advocacy groups have petitioned
8 The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's National Marine Fisheries
Service (NMFS) (also known as NOAA-Fisheries) administers the ESA for most marine
species and anadromous fish. My principal focus is on the FWS and terrestrial and
freshwater species. What is observed in this Article about the ESA, however, applies
equally to administration of the statute by the NMFS.
9 See U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., http://www.fws.gov/endangered/ (last visited Feb. 20,
2008) (describing the Endangered Species Program).
10 See J. Michael Scott et al., By the Numbers, in THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT AT
THIRTY, supra note 7, at 16, 29-32.
" Philip E. Hulme, Adapting to Climate Change: Is There Scope for Ecological
Management in the Face of a Global Threat?, 42 J. APPLIED ECOLOGY 784, 784 (2005). In
its 2007 Synthesis Report, the IPCC predicts that "[t]here is medium confidence that
approximately 20-30% of species assessed so far are likely to be at increased risk of
extinction if increases in global average warming exceed 1.5-2.5'C," and that if warming
"exceeds about 3.5'C, model projections suggest significant extinctions (40-70% species
assessed) around the globe." 2007 SYNTHESIS REPORT SUMMARY, supra note 2, at 13. For
extensive discussion of the basis of this assessment, see infra Part I.
12 See Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; 12-Month Petition Finding and
Proposed Rule To List the Polar Bear (Ursus maritimus) as Threatened Throughout Its
Range, 72 Fed. Reg. 1064 (proposed Jan. 9, 2007) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17). The
agency proposed the rule based on a citizen petition for rulemaking. Also acting on a
petition, the FWS recently initiated a status review of ten species of penguins based on
threats, including climate change impacts. See Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and
Plants; 90-Day Finding on a Petition To List 12 Penguin Species as Threatened or
Endangered Under the Endangered Species Act, 72 Fed. Reg. 37,695 (July 11, 2007).
NMFS has identified several coral species for ESA protection based in part on the effects of
global climate change. See Endangered and Threatened Species: Final Listing
Determinations for Elkhorn Coral and Staghorn Coral, 71 Fed. Reg. 26,852 (May 9, 2006).
13 See Appropriators Urge Interior to Deepen Review of How Global Warming is
Affecting Species, 38 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1015, 1015 (2007).
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the agency to promulgate rules to address climate change, 14 and one court has
admonished the agency for failing to take climate change into account in its
regulatory programs.
15
Practically speaking, however, what can the ESA do for the pika or the polar
bear? The ESA takes a species-specific approach that has proven effective
when employed to address discrete human-induced threats that have
straightforward causal connections to a species, such as clearing of occupied
habitat for development or damming of a river. 16 That is not the pika's or the
polar bear's situation. Rather, all anthropogenic sources of greenhouse gases
throughout the planet, from a small farm to a sprawling refinery, are
contributing to the demise of the pika and polar bear, and the species' decline
in both cases is gradual and largely invisible to human perception. The causal
chain is less direct than, say, a salmon that finds a dam in its way. Pikas and
polar bears will not drop dead because of exposure to greenhouse gas
emissions - the species will just fade away as their habitats transform below
their feet. The ESA has proven to be unwieldy when applied on large working
landscape levels, 17 so is there reason to believe it will be any more effective
when applied on global levels to this kind of creeping oblivion?
The pika and polar bear thus serve as examples of the tension global climate
change will create in the administration of the ESA and other environmental
laws. On the one hand, the case for bringing these and other climate-
14 Center for Biological Diversity, Petition for Rulemaking To Amend Federal
Regulations To Enhance the Recovery of Endangered Species and Address the Growing
Impacts of Global Warming on Imperiled Species, at 3 (Feb. 1, 2007), available at
http://www.biologicaldiversity.org/swcbd/programs/bdes/gw-es/apa-petition.pdf [hereinafter
Petition for Rulemaking]; see also Environmental Groups Seek Federal Action with Rules
on Effects of Global Warming, 38 Env't Rep. (BNA) 308, 308 (2007) (announcing the filing
of the Center for Biological Diversity's petition).
15 See Natural Res. Def. Council v. Kempthome, 506 F. Supp. 2d 322, 370 (E.D. Cal.
2007) ("FWS acted arbitrarily and capriciously by failing to address the issue of climate
change .. "). For further discussion, see infra text accompanying notes 228-29.
16 See Barton H. Thompson Jr., Managing the Working Landscape, in THE ENDANGERED
SPECIES ACT AT THIRTY, supra note 7, at 101, 104 ("[ESA enforcement] has had the greatest
impact on active changes in species habitat (e.g., the construction of new subdivisions,
timber harvesting, and water diversions) .... ). The seminal ESA case, and icon of
preservationism in American environmental law, involved a dam. Tenn. Valley Auth. v.
Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 157 (1978). In that case the Court halted the construction of a nearly
completed, federally financed dam project because the federal agencies involved had not
complied with the ESA. Id. at 172-73. When asked to refuse to enjoin the construction as a
matter of equity and common sense, the Court found that the ESA "admits of no exception"
and "indicates beyond doubt that Congress intended endangered species to be afforded the
highest of priorities." Id. at 173-74. The Court refused to "make such fine utilitarian
calculations" given that "Congress viewed the value of endangered species as
'incalculable."' Id. at 187.
17 See A. Dan Tarlock, The Dynamic Urban Landscape, in THE ENDANGERED SPECIES
ACT AT THIRTY, supra note 7, at 127, 127-32; Thompson, supra note 16, at 104-26.
[Vol. 88:1
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threatened species under the ESA's protective wings seems as unequivocal as
they come, regardless of whether greenhouse gas emissions contribute to the
climate change effects. On the other hand, given the reasonably anticipated
trajectory of global climate change and its effects on ecosystems, there soon
may be no practical way to administer the ESA in its present form for those
species. As the authors of one environmental law casebook described the
dilemma:
Are the ESA's rationales dwarfed by the current reality of global climate
change? If it were possible to show that over the next century as many as
half of all endangered species were likely to be rendered extinct by global
warming, a condition that appears to be human-augmented but quite
impervious to legal liability, would the ESA become an obsolete footnote
or continue to be a practicable tool, a worthwhile declaration of principle,
and a utilitarian canary in a coal mine? 18
If what threatens the pika's survival also threatens the ESA's usefulness,
these questions are not just for academic discourse. A "worthwhile declaration
of principle" that has no practicable means of implementation would present
quite a predicament for the FWS. And yet it is not a situation the agency can
easily avoid, as the ESA contains a citizen petition procedure requiring the
agency to consider species for protection, 9 and a citizen suit provision
allowing private attorney general actions to enforce the statute.20 If past
experience is any indication, the stream of petitions to protect species based on
global climate change effects will flow stronger, citizen suits will push harder
on the agency to use the ESA's regulatory power to attack greenhouse gas
emissions, and other suits will be filed to object if the agency attempts to do
either.
2 1
The ESA is by no means unique in finding itself between a rock and a hard
place due to climate change. For example, the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) recently denied a citizen rulemaking petition asking the agency
to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from motor vehicles as an air pollutant
under the Clean Air Act. 22 The agency dismissed the petition on the basis that
global climate change is so complicated either Congress did not provide for
greenhouse gas emissions to be subject matter for the Clean Air Act or, if
18 ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE, LAW, AND
SOCIETY 783 (3d ed. 2004).
,9 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3) (2000).
20 Id. § 1540(g).
21 For example, citizen petitions, frequently followed by citizen suits, have been a major
force behind the identification of species for ESA protection. See D. Noah Greenwald et al.,
The Listing Record, in THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT AT THIRTY, supra note 7, at 51, 54-
63.
22 See Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg.
52,922, 52,922 (Sept. 8, 2003).
2008]
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Congress did so provide, the agency properly identified conflicting policy
concerns as a basis for deciding not to regulate emissions.
23
Indeed, the EPA's reasoning might have been attractive to the FWS and
other regulatory agencies hoping to avoid the myriad of difficult policy issues
surrounding climate change: Congress could not have meant for them to
incorporate the ubiquitous, complex dynamics of global climate change into
each and every discrete regulatory program, and even if Congress did have that
in mind, the broad discretion agencies usually enjoy under regulatory statutes
provides enough wiggle room to dodge the bullet. The agencies are off the
hook. The pika can fend for itself.
But the Supreme Court has nipped this kind of reasoning in the bud. In
Massachusetts v. EPA,24 a majority of the Court found that the EPA erred in
denying the rulemaking petition, making clear the principle that simply
because Congress did not have climate change on its mind when it drafted a
law does not mean thirty or however many years later the agency responsible
for implementing the law can ignore the effects of climate change. 25 Like any
other phenomenon that comes along after a statute is enacted, if global climate
change becomes relevant to the statutory text and policy, it is fair game, if not
mandatory fodder, for incorporation into the regulatory program. Hence, the
Court concluded, greenhouse gas emissions, because they are linked to climate
23 See id. at 52,929-31.
24 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007).
25 See id. at 1462-63. For a concise yet thorough summary of the rulemaking petition,
the EPA's decision, lower court proceedings, the Supreme Court's majority and dissenting
opinions, and the likely impact of the case, see generally Arnold W. Reitze Jr., Controlling
Greenhouse Gas Emissions From Mobile Sources - Massachusetts v. EPA, 37 Envtl. L.
Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,535 (2007). For additional background, see generally Michael
Sugar, Case Comment, Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency, 31 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REv. 531 (2007).
[Vol. 88:1
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change and its numerous anticipated ill effects, 26 fit the Clean Air Act's broad
definition of an air pollutant.27 As the Court put it:
While the Congresses that drafted [the Clean Air Act] might not have
appreciated the possibility that burning fossil fuels could lead to global
warming, they did understand that without regulatory flexibility,
changing circumstances and scientific developments would soon render
the Clean Air Act obsolete. The broad language [of the statute] reflects
an intentional effort to confer the flexibility necessary to forestall such
obsolescence.
28
Hence, the Clean Air Act charged the EPA with regulating greenhouse gas
emissions from motor vehicles if in the EPA's "judgment [the emissions]
cause, or contribute to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to
endanger public health or welfare. ' '29 Noting that the Clean Air Act defines
"welfare" to include "effects on ... weather ... and climate," the Court
rejected the EPA's proffered bases for its judgment not to regulate greenhouse
gas emissions. 30 The EPA had taken the position that, even if it had authority
to treat greenhouse gas emissions as a pollutant, it would exercise its discretion
not to do so in order to accommodate other priorities, such as facilitating the
President's flexibility to negotiate with other nations on climate change. 31
These other priorities, however, were not within the scope of the agency's
discretion under the Clean Air Act:
26 The majority opinion begins with the observation that "[a] well-documented rise in
global temperatures has coincided with a significant increase in the concentration of carbon
dioxide in the atmosphere. Respected scientists believe the two trends are related."
Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1446. This basic factual assertion is accepted and extended
throughout the opinion, leading one observer to suggest that "the broader cultural or
symbolic significance of the decision" is that "[t]he Court has accepted - indeed has seemed
to internalize - the beliefs, assumptions, and values that animate the environmentalists'
views on climate change." Jonathan Z. Cannon, The Significance of Massachusetts v. EPA,
93 VA. L. REv. IN BRIEF 51, 59 (2007), http://www.virginialawreview.org/inbrief/
2007/05/2 1/cannon.pdf. Indeed, the case is regarded as "[a] breathtaking result for
environmentalists. The first time that environmentalists have both persuaded the Supreme
Court to grant review over the federal government's opposition and then won on the
merits." Richard Lazarus, A Breathtaking Result for Greens, ENVTL. F., May-June 2007, at
12, 12.
27 Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1459-60. The Clean Air Act defines "air pollutant" in
sweeping terms to include "any air pollution agent... including any physical, chemical [or]
biological ... substance or matter which is emitted into or otherwise enters the ambient air."
42 U.S.C. § 7602(g) (2000). The Court found that "greenhouse gases fit well within [this]
capacious definition." Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1462.
28 Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1462.
29 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2000).
30 See Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1447 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7602(h)).
3' Id. at 1462-63.
2008]
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Under the clear terms of the Clean Air Act, EPA can avoid taking further
action [to regulate carbon emissions from motor vehicles] only if it
determines that greenhouse gases do not contribute to climate change or if
it provides some reasonable explanation as to why it cannot or will not
exercise its discretion to determine whether they do. To the extent that
this constrains agency discretion to pursue other priorities of the
Administrator or the President, this is the congressional design.
32
So too, pika lovers might argue, must the ESA be construed to require the
FWS to integrate the changing circumstances and scientific developments
surrounding climate change into administration of the statute. Indeed, after
Massachusetts v. EPA, one can argue it is incumbent on all federal regulatory
agencies to assess how global climate change is to be integrated into their
respective regulatory programs. 33 There is no dodging the bullet - each agency
must place the current knowledge of climate change and its reasonably
anticipated trajectory next to its regulatory statute and ask how its knowledge
and the statute fit together.
Yet in setting this inquiry in motion, the Court raised far more questions
than it answered. It is one thing to say an agency must consider whether
climate change triggers regulatory authority under a particular statute. It is
quite another thing to decide what response the statute requires. Just as
agencies are not immune from having to incorporate global climate change as
regulatory subject matter, climate change as regulatory subject matter is not
immune from agency discretion. Some statutes - perhaps the Clean Air Act is
an example - will force an agency down a narrow road toward regulation of
greenhouse gas emissions. Other statutes, however, will leave ample room for
an agency to argue, depending on its agenda, that greenhouse gas emissions
and climate change are not appropriate subjects for regulation. Evaluating the
fit between a regulatory program and climate change will, thus, often boil
32 Id. at 1462 (citation omitted). As its only example of a "reasonable explanation," the
Court suggested that the EPA might find "the scientific uncertainty is so profound that it
precludes EPA from making a reasoned judgment as to whether greenhouse gases contribute
to global warming." Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1463. Yet, having previously observed
that "respected scientists" believe greenhouse gases do contribute to climate change, the
Court seems to have left EPA little wiggle room. Massachusetts, 127 S.Ct at 1446; see
Cannon, supra note 26, at 57; Reitze, supra note 25, at 10,538.
33 For example, the Ninth Circuit recently faulted the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration for failing to take climate change effects into account when promulgating
fuel economy standards for light trucks and SUVs. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Nat'l
Highway Traffic Safety Admin., No. 06-71891, 2007 WL 3378240, at *17-19 (9th Cir. Nov.
15, 2007). Also, several institutional investors recently petitioned the Securities and
Exchange Commission to require companies to disclose more information and analysis of
the financial risks they face from climate change effects and the regulation of greenhouse
gas emissions. California Public Employees Retirement System et al., Petition for
Interpretive Guidance on Climate Change Disclosure, at 2-3 (2007), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2007/petn4-547.pdf.
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down to identifying the scope of an agency's discretion with respect to climate
change and determining how the agency can legitimately exercise that
discretion. The EPA knows now that it must make a decision about the effects
of greenhouse gas emissions from motor vehicles and whether to regulate those
emissions, but what is the scope of the agency's discretion in making that
decision? That is the question the Court in Massachusetts v. EPA left for the
EPA to answer under the Clean Air Act.34
This Article explores that question from the perspective of the ESA as
presently constituted.35 Part I of the Article describes the effects of climate
change and different ways in which it is likely to exacerbate species
endangerment, both in terms of number of species at risk and severity of their
imperilment. As noted ecologist Jane Lubchenko has put it, "we've entered
new territory. '36 Complex direct and indirect mechanisms are likely to be in
play, usually in ways less obvious than the stranding of the pika or the melting
away of the polar bear's ice. Many ecologists believe we face a no-analog
future - one for which we have no experience on which to base projections of
ecosystem change,37 and for which models designed to allow active
management decisions as climate change takes effect are presently rudimentary
and imprecise.38 It is not as if ecosystems will move intact as climate
conditions shift; rather, they will disassemble as climate change rips. apart
existing hydrological, temperature, fire, flood, drought, wind, and pest regimes
at local levels, with new assemblies forming in their place. And as humans
adapt to climate change by moving away from coastal areas and shifting the
locations of agricultural land uses, it is likely that we will disturb ecological
systems with potentially dramatic effects on resident species. A taxonomy of
climate change effects on species thus is useful for understanding the
challenges the FWS will face in administering the ESA as the realities of
climate change begin to take hold in ecosystems. 39
34 See Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1463 ("We need not and do not reach the question
whether on remand EPA must make an endangerment finding, or whether policy concerns
can inform EPA's actions in the event that it makes such a finding.").
31 This Article addresses the scope of agency discretion under existing statutory
provisions. Although the Article examines potential rulemaking reforms within the scope of
existing statutory authority, I neither suggest nor review proposed statutory reforms of the
ESA or any other statute to respond to climate change.
36 Interplay of Climate and Currents Disrupts Marine Ecosystems, SCIENCEDAILY, Feb.
28, 2007, http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2007/02/070218140507.htm.
17 See Douglas Fox, Back to the No-Analog Future?, 316 SCIENCE 823, 823 (2007);
Douglas Fox, When Worlds Collide, CONSERVATION, Jan.-Mar. 2007, at 28.
31 See Peter Cox & David Stephenson, A Changing Climate for Prediction, 317 SCIENCE
207, 207 (2007). For more on these modeling difficulties, see infra Part I.A.
39 It also provides an example of what regulatory programs dealing with human social
and economic institutions can expect in a climate-change future. Like ecosystems, one can
foresee human communities and economies responding in "reshuffling" patterns that defy
extrapolation from historical trends and for which models are, at present, theoretical at best.
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Yet the FWS, like most administrative agencies, has been implementing the
ESA's regulatory programs for decades, so what is new about climate change?
What is the challenge, other than there being more species at risk and many of
them in more dire straits? Is it just a matter of degree, or is climate change a
different kind of problem altogether? Part II of the Article engages these
questions by exploring the types of challenges climate change will pose for the
ESA. As many agencies must, the FWS often exercises its discretion by
balancing the statute's primary purpose (protecting species), other mediating
statutory criteria (e.g., economic impacts), and background social, legal, and
economic contexts not registered directly in the statute but placing pressure on
its implementation (e.g., property rights).40 Global climate change does not fit
into one of those boxes; rather, it engulfs all of them and shakes the regulatory
system at its roots. The range of possible (but not necessarily permissible)
policy responses an agency might devise in such a dynamic and uncertain
context is thus quite broad, from doing absolutely nothing to incorporating
global climate change into every nook and cranny of the regulatory program.
The FWS will face these choices with respect to the emission of greenhouse
gases, actions that harm species endangered because of climate change, and
conservation efforts that may be impeded by climate change.
Of course, the choices are not all for the FWS to make. Part III of the
Article methodically evaluates the permissible discretion Congress has defined
for the agency's selection of climate change policies. Like many regulatory
statutes, the ESA is a conglomerate of different regulatory tasks and programs,
each with its own idiosyncratic discretionary context, and thus each presents a
different fit with global climate change. The challenge for the FWS is that
each species presents its own set of circumstances with respect to the effects of
climate change, meaning the agency has potentially thousands of different
scenarios to track through its statutory discretion analysis. Overall, the
analysis shows that the agency has considerable flexibility in terms of how it
uses (or doesn't use) global climate change as a driver of regulatory policy.
If, for example, climate change shifts agriculturally productive conditions northward from,
say, Kansas, how likely is it that agricultural communities in Kansas will simply pick up and
relocate northward fully intact? Consider, for example, the diaspora of New Orleanians that
followed Hurricane Katrina. Of over 1.3 million applicants for federal assistance, eighty-six
percent came from people who had relocated to Louisiana, Mississippi, Texas, and
Alabama, but applications came from every state and from more than 35,000 families that
had moved over 1000 miles from the Gulf. See Katrina's Diaspora,
http://www.nytimes.com/imagepages/2005/10/02/national/nationalspecial/20051002diaspor
a-graphic.html (last visited Jan. 12, 2008) (showing the results of. a New York Times
investigation of the distribution of Hurricane Katrina victims). Over half of the applications
were filed by people that had relocated over 100 miles from New Orleans. See id.
40 The examples given define the history of ESA implementation. See J. Michael Scott et
al., Introduction to THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT AT THIRTY, supra note 7, at 3, 3
(characterizing the ESA as a legislative attempt to "reconcile the preservation of nature with
increasing human population and consumption").
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Nevertheless, some choke points limit the agency's discretion and, if
Massachusetts v. EPA is any indication, will force the FWS to confront
difficult policy decisions.
Given that regulatory landscape, Part IV addresses the practical question of
what the FWS should do in the absence of congressional action, either with
respect to the ESA specifically or in more general ways that relieve pressure
from the ESA. I propose a coherent game plan for the agency based on four
assumptions: (1) even with swift and effective adoption of global-wide
greenhouse gas emission mitigation measures, some residual climate change
will continue to occur over the next fifty years;41 (2) realistically, global-wide
mitigation measures will not entirely reverse greenhouse gas emissions to 1990
levels; but (3) mitigation measures will stabilize emissions at a level which
will allow global climate regimes to eventually settle into a "natural" pattern of
variation; and (4) some species will not survive the transition from the present
to that future no matter what actions the FWS takes under the ESA, but others
can make it if we help them through the transition. Under these assumptions, I
argue that the FWS should not attempt to use the ESA to combat greenhouse
gas emissions or save all species threatened by climate change, but rather
should use it as the bridge to the no-analog future for those species that can
benefit from the ESA's helping hand. Part IV closes by elaborating on the
policy choices the agency should make to implement this use of the ESA,
including how to respond to the effects of human adaptations to climate
change.
42
Like most other existing regulatory statutes, the ESA was not enacted with
global climate change in mind, and the ESA alone will not arrest the causes or
effects of our planet's no-analog future. But for the foreseeable future, until
Congress or the states adopt statutes responding directly and comprehensively
to climate change, the ESA is the nation's principal species conservation
program. Even if the ESA cannot reverse climate change, pressure will be
brought to bear on the FWS, just as it was on the EPA, to use its regulatory
powers to "whittle away" at the problem. 43 After Massachusetts v. EPA the
41 See Richard A. Kerr, How Urgent Is Climate Change?, 318 SCIENCE 1230, 1230
(2007) ("The system has built in time lags. Ice sheets take centuries to melt after a warming.
The atmosphere takes decades to be warmed by today's greenhouse gas emissions.").
42 Until recently, legal scholarship on climate change has focused primarily on mitigation
efforts - i.e., legal measures aimed at reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Given the reality
that climate change will continue for some time even if stiff measures are taken globally to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions over the next 25-50 years, attention is turning to the law of
climate change adaptation - i.e., regulation and facilitation of human responses to climate
change. For a sweeping overview of many of the environmental law issues relating to
climate change adaptation (though not including the ESA issues in detail), see generally
Matthew D. Zinn, Adapting to Climate Change: Environmental Law in a Warmer World, 34
ECOLOGY L.Q. 61 (2007).
43 As the majority in Massachusetts v. EPA observed, "[a]gencies, like legislatures, do
not generally resolve massive problems in one fell swoop, but instead whittle away over
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agency will have little choice but to do so, the only questions being where and
how deeply it must cut.
I. CLIMATE CHANGE AS AN AGENT OF ECOLOGICAL RESHUFFLING
The ESA is a change-management law designed to arrest change in one
direction - the decline of a species - and bring about a new trajectory of
change - recovery of the species. The FWS administers several core programs
aimed toward that objective, the details of which are more fully explored later
in the Article:
- Section 4 of the ESA authorizes the FWS to identify "endangered" and
"threatened" species, known as the listing function,4a and then to
designate "critical habitat"4 5 and develop "recovery plans"46 for the
species.
0 Section 7 requires all federal agencies to "consult" with the FWS to
ensure that actions they carry out, fund, or authorize do not "jeopardize"
the continued existence of listed species or "adversely modify" their
critical habitat.
4 7
time, refining their approach as circumstances change and they develop a more nuanced
understanding of how best to proceed." Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1457
(2007) (citations omitted).
4 16 U.S.C. § 1522(a)(1) (2000). For a description of the listing process, see generally
LIEBESMAN & PETERSEN, supra note 7, at 15-20; STANFORD ENVTL. LAW Soc'Y, supra note
7, at 38-58; SULLINS, supra note 7, at 11-25; J.B. Ruhl, Section 4 of the ESA: The Keystone
of Species Protection Law, in LAW, POLICY, AND PERSPECTIVES, supra note 7, at 19, 19-33;
infra notes 120-30 and accompanying text.
41 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(3) (2000). For a description of the critical habitat designation
process, see generally LIEBESMAN & PETERSEN, supra note 7, at 20-24; STANFORD ENVTL.
LAW SOC'Y, supra note 7, at 59-69; SULLINS, supra note 7, at 26-28; Federico Cheever,
Endangered Species Act: Critical Habitat, in LAW, POLICY, AND PERSPECTIVES, supra note
7, at 47; Murray D. Feldman & Michael J. Brennan, The Growing Importance of Critical
Habitat for Species Conservation, 16 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 88 (2001); infra notes 131-
39 and accompanying text.
46 16 U.S.C. § 1533(f) (2000). For a description of the recovery plan process, see
generally LIEBESMAN & PETERSEN, supra note 7, at 24-26; STANFORD ENVTL. LAW SOC'Y,
supra note 7, at 71-77; SULLINS, supra note 7, at 34-37; John M. Volkman, Recovery
Planning, in LAW, POLICY, AND PERSPECTIVES, supra note 7, at 71; infra notes 140-47 and
accompanying text.
47 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2000). For a description of the consultation process, see
generally LIEBESMAN & PETERSEN, supra note 7, at 27-39; STANFORD ENVTL. LAW SOC'Y,
supra note 7, at 83-103; SULLINS, supra note 7, at 59-86; Marilyn Averill, Protecting
Species Through Interagency Cooperation, in LAW, POLICY, AND PERSPECTIVES, supra note
7, at 87; infra notes 169-91 and accompanying text.
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. Section 9 requires that all persons, including all private and public
entities subject to federal jurisdiction, avoid committing "take" of listed
species of fish and wildlife.
48
- Sections 7 (for federal agency actions) 49 and 10 (for actions not subject
to Section 7)50 establish a procedure and criteria for FWS to approve
"incidental take" of listed species.
5 1
These programs generate the regulatory firepower needed to effectively
intervene in several categories of environmental change that cause species
decline: (1) the present or threatened destruction, modification, or curtailment
of habitat; (2) over-utilization for commercial, recreational, scientific, or
educational purposes; (3) disease or predation; and (4) other natural or
manmade factors.52 Of course, this authority is only useful in circumstances
where intervention is feasible and effective. For example, habitat loss, the
leading cause of species decline, 53 is often the result of easily identifiable
human-induced factors susceptible to discrete and effective regulation. 54 By
contrast, invasive species, the runner-up in causes of species decline,
55
41 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1) (2000). For a description of the cases developing the legal
standards for what constitutes "take," see generally LIEBESMAN & PETERSEN, supra note 7,
at 39-46; STANFORD ENVTL. LAW SOC'Y, supra note 7, at 104-12; SULLINS, supra note 7, at
44-54; Alan M. Glen & Craig M. Douglas, Taking Species: Difficult Questions of Proximity
and Degree, 16 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 65 (2001); Gina Guy, Take Prohibitions and
Section 9, in LAW, POLICY, AND PERSPECTIVES, supra note 7, at 191; Steven P. Quarles &
Thomas R. Lundquist, When Do Land Use Activities "Take" Listed Wildlife Under ESA
Section 9 and the "Harm" Regulation?, in LAW, POLICY, AND PERSPECTIVES, supra note 7,
at 207; infra notes 148-68 and accompanying text.
49 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(4) (2000).
5o Id. § 1539(a)(1).
11 "Incidental take," although not explicitly defined in a specific statutory provision, is
described in section 10 of the statute as take that is "incidental to, and not the purpose of, the
carrying out of an otherwise lawful activity." Id. § 1539(a)(1)(B). The FWS has adopted
this meaning in regulations implementing section 7's incidental take authorization. 50
C.F.R. § 402.02 (2003). For a description of the incidental take authorization procedures,
see generally LIEBESMAN & PETERSEN, supra note 7, at 46-50; STANFORD ENVTL. LAW
SOC'Y, supra note 7, at 127-73; SULLINS, supra note 7, at 87-102; infra notes 192-202 and
accompanying text.
52 These are the factors upon which listing decisions are made. See 16 U.S.C. §
1533(a)(1)(A)-(E) (2000).
53 See David Wilcove et al., Quantifying Threats to Imperiled Species in the United
States, 48 BIOSCIENCE 607, 609 (1998).
54 Indeed, this is the source of the statute's "pit bull" status and largely the reason it is so
controversial - discrete actions directly impairing the habitat of protected species make for
easy targets of ESA regulation. See Glen & Douglas, supra note 48, at 68 (discussing the
proof and causation requirements necessary to demonstrate harm).
11 See Wilcove et al., supra note 53, at 609.
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typically present exceedingly complex causes and solutions, 56 meaning there
usually is no identifiable regulatory target.5 7
In this respect, climate change presents a complicated scenario. To be sure,
there is an easily identifiable regulatory target: greenhouse gas emissions.
Leaving until later the question of how much discretion the ESA affords the
FWS to regulate greenhouse gas emissions, there are obvious practical
obstacles to this approach. First, regulating emissions in the United States
alone is highly unlikely to sufficiently reduce global emission levels.58
Second, even if regulatory measures are implemented worldwide to curtail
emissions, the political reality is that the measures will impose phased-in
reductions taking several decades to return to benchmark emission levels
designed to stabilize or reduce greenhouse gas concentrations in the
troposphere:59 Third, and most significantly, even if benchmark levels are
56 See Peter M. Vitousek et al., Biological Invasions as Global Environmental Change,
84 AM. SCIENTIST 468, 472-77 (1996). For a series of articles covering the invasive species
issue comprehensively, see generally Special Section: Population Biology of Invasive
Species, 17 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 24-92 (2003).
57 One exception is ship ballast water discharges, which have been a remarkably
effective means of transporting aquatic species around the globe and have thus become a
subject of regulatory interest. See Sandra B. Zellmer, The Virtues of "Command and
Control" Regulation: Barring Exotic Species from Aquatic Ecosystems, 2000 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1233, 1234. The United States Coast Guard adopted regulations covering ballast water
discharges in 2004. See 33 C.F.R. §§ 151.1500-.1518, 151.2000-.2065 (2007).
58 The FWS cannot regulate developing nations such as China, which has become the
world's leading source of greenhouse gas emissions and has shown only tentative interest in
self-imposed or internationally-imposed emission limits. See Kathleen E. McLaughlin,
China, Report Says Country Has Already Overtaken U.S. as Leading Source of Carbon
Emissions, 38 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1429, 1429 (June 29, 2007); Daniel Pruzin, China,
Country 'Will Not Accept' Emissions Limits; Government Advisor Cites Insufficient Data,
38 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1515, 1515 (July 13, 2007); Hou Yanli & Hu Min, China and Her
Coal, WORLDWATCH, Jan.-Feb. 2007, at 14, 14.
59 For example, following California's lead, in 2007 Florida Governor Charlie Crist
signed executive orders directing the adoption of maximum emission levels of greenhouse
gases for electric utilities. See State of Florida, Office of the Governor, Exec. Order 07-127
(July 13, 2007), available at http://www.myfloridaclimate.com/news/article/34. The
standard will require a reduction of emissions to 2000 levels by 2017, to 1990 levels by
2025, and to 80 percent of 1990 levels by 2050. Id. Florida will also adopt the California
motor vehicle emission standards, pending EPA approval of a waiver from federal
standards, imposing a 22-percent reduction in vehicle emissions by 2012 and a 30-percent
reduction by 2016. Id. For summaries of other proposed and adopted federal and state
benchmarks, see generally Stephen C. Jones & Paul R. McIntyre, Filling the Vacuum: State
and Regional Climate Change Initiatives, 38 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1640 (2007); Pew Ctr. on
Global Climate Change, A Look at Emissions Targets, http://www.pewclimate.
org/what s being__done/targets (last visited Nov. 16, 2007). Many observers believe these
benchmarks are unrealistic. See, e.g., Robert N. Stavins, Free GHG Cuts: Too Good To Be
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attained in the near future, the physical dynamics of greenhouse gas effects on
climate are such that climate change will continue on its present trajectory for a
significant time period.
60
Thus, even if the ESA is enlisted as a regulatory weapon against greenhouse
gas emissions, the imminent challenge for the statute will be how to address
the unavoidable impacts of climate change that have been set in motion by past
emissions and which will play out over at least the next 50 years. In this sense,
climate change presents scenarios that make anything the FWS has faced in the
past look simple. A complex array of climate change effects will lead directly
to primary and secondary stresses on ecosystems which we have never before
seen or even contemplated, not to mention a tertiary wave of stresses caused
when humans themselves adapt to climate change. The picture, to say the
least, is not pretty.
A. Feedback, Nonlinearity, and Reshuffling - Facing a No-Analog Future
Three metrics drive much of the discussion of climate change as a global
phenomenon: rising tropospheric carbon dioxide levels as a causal agent, and
escalating mean global surface temperatures and rising sea levels as the global
effects. 61 The cause and effect relationships at this level are fairly well
understood: carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases trap heat radiating
from the earth's surface, which causes surface level temperatures to rise, which
in turn causes polar and glacial ice to melt and ocean water volume to expand,
which cause sea levels to rise.62 Nevertheless, models of surface temperature
and sea level changes assembled not too long ago are already proving
inaccurate based on observed conditions. In general, although commonly
accepted projections of carbon dioxide levels in the atmosphere appear to
closely track observed conditions, the global mean surface temperature is
rising at a rate in the far upper range of model predictions and the sea level is
True?, ENVTL. F., May-June 2007, at 16, 16 (asserting that the cost estimates California is
providing for its benchmark goals are wildly low).
60 See IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS SUMMARY, supra note 2, at 19 ("Past emissions
are estimated to involve some unavoidable warming... even if atmospheric greenhouse gas
concentrations remain at 2000 levels."). Of course, if one believes that climate change is a
purely natural phenomenon, then presumably it will continue for some period - perhaps a
very long period - regardless of emission reductions.
61 See Stefan Rahmstorf et al., Recent Climate Observations Compared to Projections,
316 SCIENCE 709, 709 (2007).
62 This causal chain as well as other primary and secondary drivers, both natural and
anthropogenic, are covered in PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS SUMMARY, supra note 2, at 10-17.
Although much attention has been focused on ice sheet calving and melting, melting of
glacial ice appears to be contributing about sixty percent of the "new water" component of
sea level rise. See Mark F. Meier et al., Glaciers Dominate Eustatic Sea-Level Rise in the
21st Century, 317 SCIENCE 1064, 1064 (2007).
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rising faster than the upper range of model predictions. 63 More recent models
suggest the trends will soon drift considerably above those ranges.64 In other
words, even what we understand best about climate change has proven difficult
to model and predict.
Climate change, it turns out, is not a one-variable, one-way phenomenon.
Greenhouse gas emissions are not the only phenomena acting as a climate
change "forcing. '65 Dust, pollutant haze, and other aerosols in the atmosphere,
for example, deflect incoming solar radiation and thus have a cooling effect.
66
As temperatures rise, moreover, other positive and negative feedback effects
are triggered that could amplify or impede further warming. Melting tundra,
for example, releases more greenhouse gases, and researchers have found this
effect is far exceeding expected levels because of its feedback properties. 67 On
the other hand, increased duration and intensity of fire regimes may increase
warming effects in the short-term because of carbon dioxide emissions but
reduce temperatures in the long-term because of increased surface reflectivity
63 See Rahmstorf et al., supra note 61, at 709. Given the complexity of the problem, it is
no surprise that climate change effects models are proving difficult to calibrate. Even when
climate change has not been a factor, reliable models using weather forecast variables to
predict the secondary effects of annual weather patterns on other phenomenon have proven
elusive. One recent study showed, for example, that river-level forecasting using annual
weather forecast variables is at best moderately accurate only three days into the future. See
Richard A. Kerr, River-Level Forecasting Shows No Detectable Progress in 2 Decades, 316
SCIENCE 1555, 1555 (2007).
' See Doug M. Smith et al., Improved Surface Temperature Prediction for the Coming
Decade from a Global Climate Model, 317 SCIENCE 796, 796 (2007) (concluding that
natural cooling trends that have been offsetting human-induced warming will die out by
2009, giving way to untempered human-induced warming); see also Richard A. Kerr,
Humans and Nature Duel Over the Next Decade's Climate, 317 SCIENCE 746, 747 (2007)
(explaining the difficulty, but necessity, of building climate change models that take into
account human-induced and natural climate variation causes).
65 Climatologists refer to phenomena that have a discernable effect on climate as
"forcings." See, e.g., 2007 SYNTHESIS REPORT SUMMARY, supra note 2, at 5.
66 See Another Global Warming Icon Comes Under Attack, 317 SCIENCE 28, 28 (2007)
(explaining that because "[a]erosols cool the planet by reflecting away sunlight and
increasing the reflectivity of the clouds," climate change models can vary widely depending
on assumptions about aerosol levels).
67 See K.M. Walter et al., Methane Bubbling from Siberian Thaw Lakes as a Positive
Feedback to Climate Warming, 443 NATURE 71, 71 (2006). The effect leads to a positive
feedback loop in the following manner: as the greenhouse gases are released, they contribute
to warming that melts the tundra faster, which releases more greenhouse gases more rapidly,
and so on. See Katey M. Walter et al., Methane Bubbling from Northern Lakes: Present and
Future Contributions to the Global Methane Budget, 365 PHILOSOPHICAL TRANSACTIONS OF
THE ROYAL Soc'Y A 1657, 1671 (2007). This effect is believed to have played a significant
role in the last deglaciation. See K.M. Walter et al., Thermokarst Lakes as a Source of
Atmospheric CH4 During the Last Deglaciation, 318 SCIENCE 633, 633 (2007).
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(albedo). 68 Even some human-induced phenomena deemed environmentally
adverse in other contexts can prove helpful in the climate change context - for
example, agricultural soil erosion sequesters organic carbon in stream and lake
sediment - meaning feedback effects can cross policy realms with different
outcomes in each. 69 As climate change is increasingly studied, nonlinear
positive and negative feedback loops like these are being uncovered, 70 making
it excruciatingly difficult to construct models of global trends over long time
periods. 7
1
Indeed, even as we learn more about the highly coupled, tightly interacting
processes that comprise the climate, the likelihood is that we will realize with
even greater clarity that it is inherently unpredictable. Consider that "[t]he
envelope of uncertainty in climate projections has not narrowed appreciably
over the past 30 years, despite tremendous increases in computing power, in
observations, and in the number of scientists studying the problem.' '72 The
emerging assessment is that things are unlikely to improve:
[I]t is evident that the climate system is operating in a regime in which
small uncertainties in feedbacks are highly amplified in the resulting
climate sensitivity. We are constrained by the inevitable: the more likely
a large warming is for a given forcing (i.e., the greater the positive
feedbacks), the greater the uncertainty will be in the magnitude of that
warming. 73
68 See J.T. Randerson et al., The Impact of Boreal Forest Fire on Climate Warming, 314
SCIENCE 1130, 1130 (2006) ("Although changes in boreal forest albedo can have a
considerable cooling effect on Northern Hemisphere climate, these changes are offset by
carbon accumulation, so the net effect... on climate change may be close to neutral ......
(citations omitted)).
69 See K. Van Oost et al., The Impact ofAgricultural Soil Erosion on the Global Carbon
Cycle, 318 SCIENCE 626, 626 (2007).
70 These and others are discussed in PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS SUMMARY, supra note 2, at
10-17.
71 At the global level, one significant limitation for modeling projection accuracy is the
obvious fact that we have no experience with a global climate operating at temperatures like
those predicted. In short, "once the world has warmed by 4°C, conditions will be so
different from anything we can observe today (and still more different from the last ice age)
that it is inherently hard to say when the warming will stop." Myles R. Allen & David J.
Frame, Call Off the Quest, 318 SCIENCE 582, 582 (2007).
72 Gerard H. Roe & Marcie B. Baker, Why Is Climate Sensitivity So Unpredictable?, 318
SCIENCE 629, 629 (2007).
73 Id. at 632. But see M.D. Meyers et al., USGS Goals for the Coming Decade, 318
SCIENCE 200, 200 (2007) (expressing optimism that the USGS "will increase its capacity to
provide output from predictive and empirical models for managers to test adaptive
strategies, to reduce risk, and to increase the potential for hydrological and ecological
systems to be self-sustaining, resilient, or adaptable to climate change and related
disturbances").
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More knowledge about the climate system, in other words, does not necessarily
mean greater predictive capacity about global climate patterns.
Of course, what matters for most regulatory agencies is not how well we
predict global trends such as surface temperature and sea levels, but what
happens at the sub-global regional and local levels at which agencies act. In
other words, as surface temperatures and sea levels rise, agencies need to know
what happens next, and where. As the EPA puts it, "[e]ffects of global change
drivers differ by place and in scale, necessitating place-specific impacts
information to enable stakeholders to respond appropriately. ' ' 74 Yet even
rather fundamental secondary effects questions, such as where it will rain more
and less and how fast the ice will melt, remain open to wide variation in
available models. 75 For example, in its proposal to list the polar bear as a
threatened species under the ESA, the FWS pointed out that "studies indicate
that previous projections regarding the rate and extent of climate change
underestimated the temperature trend, reductions to annual sea ice during the
summer and winter periods, reductions to multi-year pack ice, and reductions
in thickness.
76
14 Climate and Land Use Change Effects on Ecological Resources in Three Watersheds:
A Synthesis Report, 72 Fed. Reg. 45,045, 45,046 (Aug. 10, 2007) (notice of public comment
period).
75 See, e.g., Frank J. Wentz et al., How Much More Rain Will Global Warming Bring?,
317 SCIENCE 233, 233 (2007). The difficulties associated with downscaling global climate
change to local secondary effects are relevant, of course, not only to legal responses to
threats posed to species, but to threats posed to human populations as well. See Robert L.
Glicksman, Global Climate Change and the Risks to Coastal Areas from Hurricanes and
Rising Sea Levels: The Costs of Doing Nothing, 52 Loy. L. REV. 1127, 1128 (2006).
76 Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; 12-Month Petition Finding and
Proposed Rule To List the Polar Bear as Threatened Throughout Its Range, 72 Fed. Reg.
1064, 1071 (proposed Jan 9, 2007) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17). Indeed, the degree to
which projections were off appears to be considerable - we are approximately thirty years
ahead of what models forecasted losses would have been by 2006. See Julienne Stroeve et
al., Arctic Sea Ice Decline: Faster than Forecast, 34 GEOPHYSICAL RESEARCH LETTERS
L09501, at 4-5 (2007). Part of the problem is the lack of understanding about how human-
induced and natural processes interact, with "models probably lack[ing] some realistic
feedbacks, natural processes that can amplify a climactic nudge - whether natural or
humanmade - into a shove." Richard A. Kerr, Is Battered Arctic Sea Ice Down for the
Count?, 318 SCIENCE 33, 33 (2007). In an effort to bring the models up to date with
observations in order to assist the FWS in its polar bear assessment, in 2007 the U.S.
Geological Survey screened all models that failed to predict within twenty percent of the
2006 September sea ice extent of the Arctic and projected future trends based on the
remaining models. See ERIC DEWEAVER, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, UNCERTAINTY IN
CLIMATE MODEL PROJECTIONS OF ARCTIC SEA ICE DECLINE: AN EVALUATION RELEVANT TO
POLAR BEARS 1 (2007). Using only the models that satisfied this accuracy test - there were
only ten - the agency found that "all lose at least 30% of their September ice extent, and 4
lose over 80% of their September ice by the middle of the 21 st Century." Id. Seven of the
ten models proven to be most accurate thus far are ice free by September 2099. Id.
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Indeed, for the FWS it often will be the case that what matters for a
particular species is primarily a function of local ecological conditions and
their effects on the species. The FWS, in other words, has to find models that
predict the effects of global climate warming on a wide range of physical and
biological cycles, "downscale" those effects to local ecological conditions, and
then evaluate the effects of those local changes on the species of concern.
Such specific downscaling efforts encounter the same nonlinear feedback
properties that make climate change effects difficult to model and predict at
mean global levels, but they operate with even more volatility at regional and
local levels. 77 As the U.S. Climate Change Science Program has summarized:
In spite of the great interest and importance in understanding and
forecasting ecosystem responses to climate change and variability, it is
often difficult to relate specific, observable changes in ecosystems to
climate change in a rigorous, causal manner. This is partly because
climate variables are linked to specific ecosystem responses through
complex, nonlinear chains of interacting processes. Part of the difficulty
is also related to the need to 'downscale' attributes of change in the
climate system to understand ecosystem changes at regional or
ecoregional scales. Moreover, effects of climate change on ecosystems
and their constituent species and processes are typically confounded with
effects of numerous other human actions, including land-use changes that
fragment and degrade ecosystems at various spatial scales, pollutants,
invasions of non-native species, and resource management and utilization
practices. It is difficult to tease apart effects of climate change from these
other effects. These challenges are made more difficult by the current
paucity of long-term data and information for most ecosystem types and
ecoregions, especially from experiments designed to ascertain cause-and-
effect relationships.
78
Applying these projections to the known ecoregions of polar bear habitat, the agency
concluded that two-thirds of the world's polar bear population will be lost by mid-century.
See U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, USGS SCIENCE TO INFORM U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERVICE
DECISION MAKING ON POLAR BEARS, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 2 (2007). The full set of USGS
reports is available at U.S. Geological Survey, New Polar Bear Finding,
http://www.usgs.gov/newsroom/special/polar0 /5Fbears/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2008).
77 See U.S. CLIMATE CHANGE SCIENCE PROGRAM, CCSP SYNTHESIS AND ASSESSMENT
REPORT 3.1, CLIMATE MODELS: AN ASSESSMENT OF STRENGTHS AND LIMITATIONS FOR USER
APPLICATIONS, PUBLIC REVIEw DRAFT 70-71 (2007) (describing problems with existing
capacities for downscaling).
78 U.S. CLIMATE CHANGE SCIENCE PROGRAM, CCSP SYNTHESIS AND ASSESSMENT
PRODUCT 4.2, PROSPECTUS FOR THRESHOLDS OF CHANGE IN ECOSYSTEMS 1-2 (2007)
(describing the scope of research to be conducted on ecological downscaling models). It is,
of course, equally as important to study and understand macroecological effects. See
Jeremy T. Kerr et al., The Macroecological Contribution to Global Change Solutions, 316
SCIENCE 1581, 1581 (2007).
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Fundamentally, therefore, the FWS has no models of this sort at its disposal
because nobody has the experience or knowledge upon which to base them.
Ultimately, they may simply be beyond our capacity. Although all ecosystems
undergo disturbance regimes such as flood, fire, and drought, all of which we
have some experience observing and predicting, ecologists understand that
these forms of disturbance are part of the stable disequilibrium of resilient,
dynamic ecosystems.79 But climate change does not present just another
disturbance regime, the operations of which we can extrapolate from current
ecological knowledge; rather, it will be the undoing of ecosystems as we know
them. 80 As leading ecologists have observed, this makes it inherently difficult
to predict long-term outcomes for defined ecosystems:
New climates are expected to cause ecosystem reshuffling as individual
species, constrained by different environmental factors, respond
differently. One tree may be limited by summer rains that hold back
seedling recruitment, for instance, whereas another species may be
limited by winter freezes that control insect pests. Some species may
migrate up-latitude or up-elevation, while others stay put. An ecosystem
might see many species vanish - but also new arrivals.
8'
These scenarios are no longer hypothetical. For example, a group of
oceanographers, climatologists, and ecologists recently reported that unusual
ocean conditions and marine die-offs reshaped their understanding of the ocean
ecosystem off the Pacific coast of the United States.82 Synthesizing decades of
atmospheric and oceanographic data, the researchers found that drastic
fluctuations in winds and currents seem to explain observed ocean anomalies,
such as low oxygen zones and a massive die-off of seabirds.83 The underlying
weather patterns were consistent with climate change predictions, but their
effects were unexpected. As one of the researchers observed, "[c]limate
change is upon us, there is no doubt about that .... What's catching us by
surprise is the rate at which warming is hitting us. And, of course, how fast the
ocean has changed - that is what amazes me."
84
7' For a comprehensive treatment of disequilibrium and resilience theories of ecosystem
dynamics, see generally PANARCHY: UNDERSTANDING TRANSFORMATION IN HUMAN AND
NATURAL SYSTEMS (Lance H. Gunderson & C.S. Holling eds., 2002).
80 See CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS SUMMARY, supra note 2, at 8 ("The resilience of many
ecosystems is likely to be exceeded this century by an unprecedented combination of
climate change, associated disturbances (e.g., flooding, drought, wildfire, insects, ocean
acidification), and other global change drivers (e.g., land-use change, pollution, over-
exploitation of resources).").
sI Fox, supra note 37, at 823.
82 Interplay of Climate and Currents Disrupts Marine Ecosystems, supra note 36.
83 Id.
84 Id. (quoting Bill Peterson of NOAA). The U.S. Climate Change Science Program is,
as of this writing, working to complete a comprehensive overview of ecological responses
and adaptations to climate change, known as Synthesis and Assessment Product 4.4:
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This is the no-analog future of the ESA. Some effects will be more
predictable than others, such as that warmer waters will exceed the temperature
limits of some fish species.85 But many effects will be difficult to predict, such
as the cascade effects the loss of a top-level predator fish causes in its
ecosystem. 86 Where and when these effects will occur, their magnitude and
duration, and the other effects they will set in motion are questions the FWS
has only begun to confront.
B. A Typology of Climate Change Threats to Species
Accurate prediction of climate change effects on local ecological conditions
is, for now (and perhaps always will be), beyond the capacity of ecological
models. A taxonomy of effects can, nevertheless, be constructed and may be
useful for evaluating where the ESA can be most effectively employed when
climate change threatens the continued existence of a species. I divide the
taxonomy at its highest level between primary ecological effects, secondary
ecological effects, and human adaptation impacts.
87
1. Primary Ecological Effects
The pika presents a relatively straightforward scenario of climate-induced
species decline - the ecological conditions it needs for survival do not exist
below a particular temperature regime. Of course, it is possible that as climate
change takes hold, suitable conditions for the pika will materialize somewhere
else in the world, but that will do the pikas of the Great Basin little good. They
do not have the option of relocating once the temperature regime lifts above
the peaks which they now call home.88 Rather, the pika and other species with
specific ecological needs and limited migration capacity are likely to face
significant threats from this kind of first order change in ecological conditions.
Threats in this category will come in several forms:
Stranding. Some species will not be able to withstand the degradation or
complete loss of essential habitat conditions beyond tolerable thresholds
Preliminary Review of Adaptation Options for Climate-Sensitive Ecosystems and
Resources. See 72 Fed. Reg. 46,610, 46,610 (Aug. 21, 2007) (notice of availability of draft
report and request for public comments).
85 See Hans 0. Portner & Rainer Knust, Climate Change Affects Marine Fishes Through
the Oxygen Limitation of Thermal Tolerance, 315 SCIENCE 95, 95 (2007).
86 See Ransom A. Myers et al., Cascading Effects of the Loss of Apex Predatory Sharks
from a Coastal Ocean, 315 SCIENCE 1846, 1846 (2007).
87 All of the impact categories covered in my typology have been discussed to one extent
or another in scientific literature. See, e.g., CLIMATE CHANGE AND BIODIVERSITY, supra note
2, at 16-23. My arrangement of them is designed to coincide with the legal analysis of the
ESA covered infra Parts II-IV.
88 Of course, humans have the option of moving pikas to new locations. I take up the
issue of"assisted migration" below. See infra Part III.D.2.
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and will have no adaptive capacity to migrate and seek suitable conditions
elsewhere.
89
Life-Stage Habitat Loss. Some species will find ecological conditions for
essential life-stage junctures, such as migratory pathways or refuge
habitat during juvenile stages, disrupted beyond tolerable thresholds,
making the continued availability of suitable ecological conditions for
other life-stages irrelevant.90
Altered Biological Events. Some species will respond to climate change,
particularly warming of surface and water temperatures, through
phenologic changes such as shifts in the timing of budding, spawning, or
migration. If, as is likely, all ecologically linked species do not shift in
synch, some species may face significant threats.9 1
2. Secondary Ecological Effects
Not all species will find it necessary and possible to depart their current
ecosystems in order to withstand the direct effects of climate change, but many
will. Others will stay to fight it out. While humans might cheer these species
on, the aggregate effects of ecological disruption and species reshuffling are
likely to lead to several secondary threats.
Increased Stress. Some species will not experience primary ecological
changes beyond tolerable thresholds, but will experience increased stress
as those thresholds are approached and will become more susceptible to
disease, parasitism, predation, and other forms of mortality.
92
Successful Adaptive Migration. As some species adapt to climate change
by successfully migrating to and establishing in areas that present suitable
conditions, their introduction may disrupt predator-prey or other
ecological conditions to the detriment of other species. 93 One species'
successful adaptive migration, in other words, can be another's demise.
94
89 See, e.g., CLIMATE CHANGE AND BIODIVERSITY, supra note 2, at 22.
90 See, e.g., id. at 17-18.
91 See, e.g., id. at 12.
92 See, e.g., id. at 13-14.
93 See, e.g., id. at 17.
94 The reintroduction of wolves into Yellowstone illustrates the effects that can be
expected from successful migrations. Researchers believe that the wolves, by preying on
elk, have set in motion a series of ecological adjustments leading to rejuvenation of aspen
stands. In the absence of their natural predator, the grazing elk were suppressing aspen
regeneration; whereas, the introduced wolves have not only reduced elk numbers but also
have deterred them from entering aspen stands where they are easy targets. See Virginia
Morell, Aspens Return to Yellowstone, with Help from Some Wolves, 317 SCIENCE 438, 438
(2007).
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Opportunistic Invasion. Rather than increased stress effects, some
species will find an erosion of barriers, such as temperature limits or
water availability, which formerly prevented them from successfully
establishing in a particular area, notwithstanding a history of natural or
human-induced introduction opportunities. Climate change will close
down on some species, but open doors for others.95
3. Human Adaptation Impacts
Just as the primary threats to species before climate change centered around
human-induced ecological change, it is likely that human adaptation to climate
change will play a leading role in threatening species. For example, climate
change will likely lead human populations to increase rainwater harvesting and
water storage, to adjust the timing and location of crop plantings, to relocate
seawalls and other storm barriers, to relocate urban infrastructure, and to shift
recreational facilities such as ski slopes to higher altitudes.96 Several forms of
human adaptation impacts will present the most pernicious of such threats:
Direct Habitat Conversion. Many human communities are likely to find
it necessary and possible to migrate to avoid rising sea levels along
coastal areas, to relocate agricultural land uses, and to obtain secure water
supplies.97 These migrations will necessarily involve some conversion of
land uses in areas that presently provide suitable ecological conditions for
particular species, in some cases at scales sufficient to pose a threat to the
species.98
Degraded Ecological Conditions. Relocated human communities will
likely introduce ecological degradations from new or amplified pollution,
noise, water diversions, and other stresses.99 Many human communities,
relocated or not, also will implement climate change mitigation and
adaptation measures designed primarily to protect human health and
welfare, such as coastal flood barriers, which in some cases could
9' See, e.g., CLIMATE CHANGE AND BIODIVERSITY, supra note 2, at 16-17. An example
already observed is the expansion of the giant Humboldt squid into the coastal waters of
central California. Previously known in that area only during periodic El Nino events,
which allowed them to ride warm water currents northward from Mexico for temporary
foraging on hake, the squid have permanently taken residence as warmer water temperatures
present the necessary ecological conditions. See Louis D. Zeidberg & Bruce H. Robinson,
Invasive Range Expansion by the Humboldt Squid, Dosisicus gigas, in the Eastern North
Pacific, 104 PROC. OF THE NAT'L ACAD. OF SCI. 12,948, 12,949-50 (2007).
96 See 2007 SYNTHESIS REPORT SUMMARY, supra note 2, at 15.
97 See Norman Meyers, Environmental Refuges in a Globally Warmed World, 43
BIOSCIENCE 752 passim (1993).
98 See CLIMATE CHANGE AND BIODIVERSITY, supra note 2, at 3-4.
99 See id. at 42-43.
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threaten ecological conditions for other species.100 Even planting of
forests to sequester carbon could degrade conditions for some species. 0 1
Induced Invasions. Human adaptation to climate change is likely to
involve spatial relocations, as well as increased flow of goods to new
settlement areas, which, as in the past, are likely to introduce non-native
species to local ecosystems, some of which will establish successfully.
10 2
To be sure, it can be expected that some species will fare well, perhaps even
spectacularly, with climate change. On balance, however, "[a]pproximately
20-30% of plant and animal species assessed so far are likely to be at increased
risk of extinction if increases in global average temperatures exceed 1.5-
2.5 0 C.' 10 3 Whichever of the foregoing effects takes hold, therefore, and
whenever and wherever they threaten a particular species, it seems beyond
question that the ESA has a busy future in store. The next section grounds that
assessment in practical policy terms for the FWS.
II. THE IMPACT OF CLIMATE CHANGE ON THE ESA
Recently, the director of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
opined that while he has "no doubt that. .. a trend of global warming exists,"
he is "not sure that it is fair to say that it is a problem we must wrestle with."
1°4
His reasons for advocating inaction included that it is not "within the power of
human beings to assure that the climate does not change" and that, in any
event, it is "arrogant" for us today to decide "that this particular climate we
have right here today, right now, is the best climate for all other human
beings." 5 That, of course, is one view, and it suggests a limited role for the
ESA in the development of climate change policy.
At the other extreme, scientists from the World Wildlife Fund argue that
"[t]he most direct way to protect the ecosystems in which [endangered] species,
live - the mandate of the ESA - will be to address the cause of climate change:
100 See id. at 43.
1 See id. at 36.
102 The EPA has suggested that "important progress has been made in identifying climate
change effects on invasive species, but... our understanding of effects on specific species
and interactions of other stressors needs to be improved." Effects of Climate Change on
Aquatic Invasive Species and Implications for Management and Research, 72 Fed. Reg.
45,046, 45,047 (Aug 10, 2007) (notice of availability of research report and public comment
period). Most invasive species introductions are human-induced. See Vitousek et al., supra
note 56, at 468.
103 CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS SUMMARY, supra note 2, at 11.
104 Donald Kennedy, Mixed Messages About Climate, 317 SCIENCE 169, 169 (2007)
(quoting Michael Griffin from radio interview with National Public Radio, the transcript of
which is available at NPR, NASA Administrator Michael Griffin Not Sure that Global
Warming is a Problem, http://www.npr.org/about/press/2007/053107.griffinaudio.html (last
visited Jan. 12, 2008)).
105 Id.
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greenhouse gas emissions," and that "it is important that we also consider how
implementation of the ESA can be used to reduce the vulnerability of
imperiled species and aid in their recovery despite changing conditions."'
0 6
This view suggests a much larger role for the ESA.
A. Reshuffling the Regulatory Landscape
The ESA instructs the FWS to use the regulatory powers it confers on the
agency to "provide a means whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered
and threatened species depend may be conserved."' 1 7 Achieving this primary
statutory goal presents difficult questions of policy discretion. While
preserving ecosystems is clearly the statute's primary goal, how precisely to
use the agency's regulatory discretion to "provide a means" of achieving the
goal is not self-evident from the text of the statute. Add to that the presence of
secondary goals sprinkled throughout the statute, such as the command that the
FWS "shall cooperate with State and local agencies to resolve water resource
issues in concert with conservation of endangered species"'0 8 and that
designation of critical habitat must take "into consideration the economic
impact, the impact on national security, and any other relevant impact,"' 1 9 and
the agency is confronted with yet another layer of policy balancing. Indeed,
the FWS has endured nearly constant scrutiny in Congress and the courts over
how it has executed the ESA's primary and secondary goals. 10
Alas, the balancing act does not end there for the agency. An important
driver of policy discretion under the ESA has for decades been the background
social, economic, and legal context within which the statute is situated. The
ESA's "pit-bull" reputation has come at some cost, as the statute is often
portrayed as unduly interfering with property rights, susceptible to unscientific
agency biases, and riddled with irrational fiscal outcomes. It is, to put it
mildly, not well liked in some quarters, and at some junctures in its history
those who deride the statute have been in a position to act on this sentiment.
For example, by the mid-1990s the ESA had reached a low-point in the
Republican-controlled Congress, where the statute had become a whipping boy
for property rights and "sound science" advocates."' Adeptly, however, then-
106 Lara Hanson & Christopher R. Pyke, Climate Change and Federal Environmental
Law, SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL'Y, Winter 2007, at 26, 27.
107 16 U.S.C. § 153 1(b) (2000).
108 Id. § 1531(c)(2).
109 Id. § 1533(b)(2) (2000 & Supp. 2005).
110 For an overview of the pressures the FWS has faced in this respect, including
demands on the one hand that it be more "precautionary" and on the other hand that it be
more "scientific," see generally J.B. Ruhl, The Battle Over Endangered Species Act
Methodology, 34 ENVTL. L. 555 (2004) [hereinafter Ruhl, Methodology].
II For comprehensive and thoughtful "insider" accounts of the fate of the ESA in this
period, see generally John D. Leshy, The Babbitt Legacy at the Department of Interior: A
Preliminary View, 31 ENVTL. L. 199 (2001), and Joseph L. Sax, Environmental Law at the
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Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt spearheaded a series of policy reforms
designed to forge a two-part agenda of promoting species conservation while
nonetheless responding to the concerns voiced in opposition to the statute.
One side of the agenda focused on enhancing species conservation through
greater emphasis on ecosystem-level management of habitat and other
resources vital to the sustainability of imperiled species. 112 The other side
focused on confirming the science-based mission of the statute and providing
greater voice and fairness to landowners on whose property imperiled species
are found. 113 Over time, this double-barreled agenda took many forms and led
to numerous regulatory innovations.' 14 Implementing this strategy, however,
depended on innovative interpretations of ESA authorities and the extent of
agency discretion,1 15 the very task that climate change may force on the agency
once again.
The FWS thus has been in the policy balancing game for some time,
working where it can to keep the primary and secondary statutory goals in line
and the overall statutory profile in harmony with the relevant background
policy context. So what is new about climate change for an agency already
seasoned in the exercise of policy balancing? Everything. Climate change
does not fit into one of the familiar policy realms, affecting the policy balance
by operating from within the existing set of trade-offs. Rather, climate change
operates on all levels of the policy triad - i.e., the primary mission, secondary
goals, and background policy context - at once, disrupting not only the
contents of each, but also how the trade-off dynamics between each level play
out. The ESA's primary goal of species conservation will be challenged by the
primary, secondary, and human adaptation effects of climate change. The
ESA's secondary goals, such as economic practicability and water resources
management, will face their own set of climate change challenges. And the
background policy context of property rights, scientific norms, agency
Turn of the Century; A Reportorial Fragment of Contemporary History, 88 CAL. L. REv.
2375 (2000).
l12 See, e.g., Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants: Notice of Interagency
Cooperative Policy Regarding the Role of State Agencies in Endangered Species Act
Activities, 59 Fed. Reg. 34,274, 34,275 (July 1, 1994) (emphasizing the role states play in
species conservation); George Frampton, Ecosystem Management in the Clinton
Administration, 7 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 39 passim (1996) (presenting various policies
that, in the view of one DOI official, changed the regulatory system "into a strategy that
sparks regional multi-species ecosystem planning").
113 See J.B. Ruhl, Who Needs Congress? An Agenda for Administrative Reform of the
Endangered Species Act, 6 NYU ENVTL. L.J. 367, 388-400 (1998) (providing a
cotemporaneous survey of policies serving this purpose).
114 For a retrospective summary of the full effect of the Babbitt-era reforms, see J.B.
Ruhl, Endangered Species Act Innovations in the Post-Babbittonian Era - Are There Any?,
14 DuKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 419, 430-34 (2004).
115 Once again, an insider's account provides a thoughtful perspective on the strategic
approach the Babbitt administration took. See Leshy, supra note 111, at 212-14.
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performance, fiscal constraints, and other concerns will also evolve as climate
change places broad pressure on the economy and society. How the FWS
balances between these three disassembling realms of policy attention will also
inevitably change, as the agency will have had no prior experience with the
emerging set of relationships.
In short, just as climate change will reshuffle ecosystems, it will reshuffle
the policy context of regulatory programs such as the ESA. Babbitt tested the
policy limits of the ESA against fairly well-defined constraints and complaints
that boiled down, for the most part, to politics. In the climate change era, by
contrast, what will qualify as scientifically credible, fiscally sound, attentive to
property rights, and a means of conserving species is uncharted territory for
Congress, the courts, and the agency alike. Politics will matter, but the
physical world will matter more.
B. Focal Points for Policy Choices
Where are the pervasive, transformative policy implications of climate
change most likely to place pressure on administration of the ESA? Like the
EPA after Massachusetts v. EPA, the FWS surely will find itself effectively
barred from taking the position that climate change is not occurring or, if it is
occurring, that it has no anthropogenic causal component. Unlike where the
Clean Air Act takes the EPA, however, accepting that human-induced climate
change is occurring does not lead inevitably to particular administrative duties
or findings under the ESA. No provision of the ESA addresses pollutants,
emissions, or climate in any specific regulatory sense. Rather, the statute
operates on fairly holistic levels, requiring the FWS to consider what
constitutes endangerment, take, jeopardy, and recovery of species. Far from
insulating the FWS from the need to test the range of its discretion, the general
nature of the ESA will thrust the FWS into several key policy quagmires:
Identifying Climate-Threatened Species. As no regulatory authorities of
the ESA operate until a species is listed as endangered or threatened
under Section 4 of the ESA, the initial pressure point is how the FWS
uses available science to determine the effects of climate change on
particular species. Identifying climate change as a basis for listing a
species is likely to invite charges from industry that the agency is using
weak models and sparse data, whereas declining to list a species for
which a plausible case of climate threat can be made is likely to invite
claims from environmental groups that the agency is ignoring the science.
Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions. If the FWS identifies climate
"change as a basis for designating a species for protection under the ESA,
it inevitably will face the question whether federal actions that cause,
fund, or authorize greenhouse gas emissions jeopardize the species under
Section 7, and whether any person emitting greenhouse gases is taking
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the species in violation of Section 9.116 Weak regulation of emissions
would ignore the evidence that they are the primary human activity
directly contributing to climate change, whereas strong regulation would
run into complicated cause-and-effect issues, not to mention potentially
caustic political battles.
Regulating Non-Climate Effects To Protect Climate-Threatened Species.
Regardless of how aggressively the FWS attempts to regulate greenhouse
gas emissions to protect a climate-threatened species, it inevitably will
face the problem of how aggressively to regulate other actions that injure
the species but which do not contribute to climate change, such as habitat
conversion, water diversion, and pollution. Indeed, the agency will face
this question even if it adopts the position that climate change is purely
natural in cause. For species imperiled primarily because of climate
change, however, regulating human activities having no climate change
impacts could be controversial and, in the final analysis, futile.
Designing Conservation and Recovery Initiatives. As the FWS regulates
more activities associated with climate-threatened species, it inevitably
will face the need to design conservation measures as conditions for
approval of incidental take under Sections 7 and 10, as well as the need to
formulate recovery measures for the species under Section 4. The long-
term effectiveness of such measures, however, will be thrown into
question as rising sea levels, rising temperatures, and the general
reshuffling of ecosystems alter the underlying premises used to design
them.
Species Trade-Offs. As noted above, the ESA depends on an overriding
purpose of "provid[ing] a means whereby the ecosystems upon which
endangered species and threatened species depend may be conserved."'117
Yet, the reshuffling of species under climate change conditions will make
it difficult to identify "the ecosystems" to be conserved and is likely to pit
species against species in a manner unprecedented in nature.1 18 Can the
116 Some environmental advocacy groups have made no bones about their intention to
pursue litigation forcing the FWS and NMFS to regulate greenhouse gases in order to
protect climate-threatened species and their designated critical habitat areas. For example,
the Center for Biological Diversity believes that the designation of critical habitat for
several species of climate-threatened corals "actually moves the entire Endangered Species
Act [ESA] onto a firm legal foundation for challenging global-warming pollution." See
Mark Clayton, New Tool To Fight Global Warming: Endangered Species Act?, CHRISTIAN
SCIENCE MoNrroR, Sept. 7, 2007, at USA 3 (quoting Kieran Suckling, Policy Dir., Ctr. for
Biological Diversity), available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0907/p03s03-usgn.html.
117 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (2000).
118 Obviously, species naturally compete with one another, such as for habitat and food,
or in conflict as predator and prey. There are also a number of examples in which
conservation measures taken to benefit a species protected under the ESA pose adverse
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FWS reasonably hope to defy climate change and keep existing
ecological regimes intact, or should it follow where the reshuffling leads
and work toward conserving the new order?
Dealing with the Doomed. Perhaps the most confounding question for
the FWS will be how to respond with respect to species that appear
doomed because of lack of migratory and adaptive capacity to withstand
climate change effects in their natural habitat range. Should the FWS
assist such species if it means relocating them to areas climate change has
altered in such a way as to provide suitable habitat? If so, how must the
agency take into account the impact of assisted migration on other
species? Or, if the doomed are left where they are, must the agency
expend resources protecting them, or can they be ignored?
These six policy choices define the core of the ESA: which species to
protect; which threats to regulate; how to help. Left to its own choosing, the
FWS might decide to downplay climate change as a factor in all these respects,
to integrate it aggressively, or to mix and match according to a menu of
objectives and depending on a variety of criteria. The agency might determine,
for example, that identifying all species plausibly threatened by climate change
is a salutary use of the ESA, but that expending regulatory authority on those
species threatened primarily by climate change - the doomed - is unwise. Or
it may decide that the "pit-bull" version of the ESA is the nation's most
promising mechanism for going after large emitters of greenhouse gases. The
point, however, is that the choice is not all for the FWS to make. Before
turning to what the FWS ought to do, we must consider what it can do.
III. FITTING AGENCY DISCRETION WITH CLIMATE CHANGE
Climate change inevitably will rear its head in several ESA programs. The
question will be whether the FWS will use its discretion to the fullest in an
attempt to incorporate climate change as a regulatory mechanism or, instead,.
will use its discretion to minimize the role of climate change in decision
making. But what is the extent of the agency's discretion - how passive or
aggressive can it choose to be? The petitioners who have sought rulemaking
changes to address climate change under the ESA "believe that existing law
and regulations already require the ... consideration of global warming in all
relevant decisions," but do not explain the basis for that assertion in their
petition. 119 Keeping the six policy choices outlined above in mind, this Section
examines the extent of discretion granted to the agency via five distinct ESA
effects for other species protected under the ESA or for other species generally. See NAT'L
RESEARCH COUNCIL, SCIENCE AND THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 111-23 (1995). For a
detailed case study of such a conflict in its legal context, see generally William W. Kinsey,
Zalaphus (Sea Lion) and Oncorhynchus (Salmon/Steelhead): Protected Predator Versus
Protected Prey, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, Fall 2007, at 36.
119 See Petition for Rulemaking, supra note 14, at 3 (emphasis added).
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components: the listing programs found in Section 4 of the statute; the take
regulations of Section 9; the jeopardy consultation program of Section 7; the
HCP permit program of Section 10; and, the statute's pervasive "best scientific
data available" standard for decision making.
A. Section 4: Listing, Critical Habitat, and Recovery Plans
Section 4 establishes a package of programs aimed at identifying imperiled
species: (1) the listing function, through which such species are identified as
endangered or threatened; (2) the designation of critical habitat essential for the
survival of such species; and (3) a planning function designed to identify the
steps needed for their recovery. Each program presents the FWS with
junctures of narrow and broad discretion with respect to climate change.
1. Identifying Species
Section 4(a)(l) of the ESA requires the FWS to:
[D]etermine whether any species is an endangered species or a threatened
species because of any of the following factors:
(A) the present or threatened destruction, modification, or curtailment of
its habitat or range;
(B) overutilization for commercial, recreational, scientific, or educational
purposes;
(C) disease or predation;
(D) the inadequacy of existing regulatory mechanisms;
(E) other natural or manmade factors affecting its continued existence. 20
There could hardly be a more definitive mandate to consider the effects of
greenhouse gas emissions and climate change on species. Greenhouse gas
emissions are unquestionably a "manmade factor," and if as abundant evidence
suggests they are contributing to climate change, they are potentially "affecting
... [the] continued existence" of climate-threatened species. Regardless of
their causal agents, atmospheric warming, sea level rise, and other primary
ecological effects of climate change involve "the destruction, modification, or
curtailment of... [species'] habitat or range." Furthermore, the ecological
reshuffling effects of climate change contribute to secondary ecological effects
such as "disease or predation." The effects of climate change, therefore, are
unambiguously within the ambit of the listing criteria, leaving no room for the
FWS to argue that it may leave climate change out of the listing calculus.
120 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(1) (2000). The statute also requires the director of the FWS to
"make determinations required by subsection (a)(1) of this section solely on the basis of the
best scientific and commercial data available to him after conducting a review of the status
of the species." Id. § 1533(b)(1)(a). For a discussion of the "best scientific data available"
standard, see infra Part III.E.
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Hence, like the EPA under the Clean Air Act, the FWS seems stuck with the
challenge of identifying which species are endangered or threatened partly or
primarily because of climate change. The pika, which is not yet listed as
endangered or threatened, should be at the front of this line.
Although Section 4 leaves no room for debate over whether the agency must
integrate climate change effects in the listing decision, the statute provides
considerable flexibility for how the agency does so. For example, a species is
endangered if it is "in danger of extinction throughout all or a significant
portion of its range"1 21 and is threatened if it "is likely to become an
endangered species within the foreseeable future throughout all or a significant
portion of its range.' 22 These are not precise concepts. For example, what
does "all or a significant portion of its range" mean? One court described the
passage as "odd phraseology" and an "enigmatic phrase,' 23 and recently it
took the lawyers at the Department of the Interior nineteen single-spaced pages
of dense legal analysis, accompanied by seventeen single-spaced pages of
probing discussion of the ESA's legislative history, to explain to the FWS what
the lawyers believe this phrase means. 24  Between this interpretational
difficulty and phrases such as "in danger of," "is likely to," and "foreseeable
future," the FWS may not be so hemmed in after all. Given the extent of
agency expertise that must necessarily go into making such judgments, and
given the uncertainty associated with downscaling global climate change
effects to local species-specific ecological contexts, the FWS likely has
considerable play in terms of matching different climate change threat
scenarios with the ESA's endangered, threatened, not-threatened matrix.
Indeed, the agency thus far has weaved between these terms and used its
agency expertise and administrative discretion to find climate change a factor
in some cases and not in others. 25 Some species may present such compelling
121 16 U.S.C. § 1532(6) (2000).
122 Id. § 1532(20).
123 Defenders of Wildlife v. Norton, 258 F.3d 1136, 1141 (9th Cir. 2001).
124 Memorandum from Solicitor, U.S. Dep't of the Interior, to Director, U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Serv., The Meaning of "In Danger of Extinction Throughout All or a Significant
Portion of its Range" (Mar. 16, 2007).
125 For example, unlike its conclusions thus far for the polar bear and penguins, the
agency was unconvinced that the American eel is endangered as a result of the effects
climate change has had on ocean conditions, notwithstanding ample evidence that the
effects are real and posing imminent threats to the species. Compare Endangered and
Threatened Wildlife and Plants; 12-Month Finding on a Petition To List the American Eel
as Threatened or Endangered, 72 Fed. Reg. 4967, 4995 (Feb. 2, 2007) (rejecting a listing
petition "because oceanic conditions are within normal variations [and] the American eel is
evolutionarily adapted to oceanic variations"), with Thierry Wirth & Louis Bernatchez,
Decline of North Atlantic Eels: A Fatal Synergy?, 270 PROC. OF THE ROYAL SOC'Y OF
LONDON 681, 681 (2003) (compiling evidence of threats from changing oceanic conditions
associated with climate change).
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cases of climate change threat that even aggressive use of discretion could not
support a decision not to list, but many will present more ambiguous scenarios.
Another source of discretion in the listing function rests in Section 4(d),
which, as codified, provides:
Whenever any species is listed as a threatened species pursuant to
subsection (c) of this section, the Secretary shall issue such regulations as
he deems necessary and advisable to provide for the conservation of such
species. The Secretary may by regulation prohibit with respect to any
threatened species any act prohibited under section 1538(a)(1) of this
title, in the case of fish or wildlife, or section 1538(a)(2) of this title, in
the case of plants, with respect to endangered species .... 126
In an article illustrating the interplay between this. authority and the
regulatory provisions of the ESA, Madeline June Kass explained how Section
4(d) of the statute provides considerable regulatory flexibility. 127 When animal
species are listed as endangered, the "take" prohibition of Section 9 applies
automatically and fully, leaving less discretion to the FWS as to how to
regulate activities that might cause take of the species. By contrast, under
Section 4(d) the FWS has the discretion to prescribe the level of take
protection afforded species listed as threatened. Kass describes how the FWS
(like its sister agency, the NMFS) has increasingly turned to this option to
relieve the angst associated with Section 9, crafting complex rules under
Section 4(d) detailing activities that are and are not prohibited under Section
9.128
This option may prove especially useful for the FWS with respect to a
climate-threatened species. It may allow the FWS to identify and regulate the
specific effects of human adaptation to climate change that pose significant
obstacles to the survival and recovery of a species, whereas broad, dispersed
actions such as greenhouse gas emissions could be entirely excluded from
regulation. Indeed, the FWS has proposed to list the polar bear as threatened,
and has suggested it might employ this approach.12 9 Of course, the success of
126 16 U.S.C. § 1533(d) (2000).
127 See Madeline June Kass, Threatened Extinction of Plain Vanilla 4(d) Rules, 16 NAT.
RESOURCES & ENV'T 78, 78-79 (2001).
128 See id. at 79-8 1.
129 See Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; 12-Month Petition Finding and
Proposed Rule To List the Polar Bear (Ursus maritimus) as Threatened Throughout Its
Range, 72 Fed. Reg. 1064, 1097 (proposed Jan. 9, 2007) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).
NMFS took this approach when it listed two coral species as threatened, in part due to
climate change effects, and noted that it would evaluate "the necessity and advisability of
proposing protective regulations pursuant to section 4(d) of the ESA for these two coral
species." Endangered and Threatened Species: Final Listing Determinations for Elkhorn
Coral and Staghorn Coral, 71 Fed. Reg. 26,852, 26,859 (May 9, 2006) (to be codified at 50
C.F.R. pt. 223); see also Robin Kundis Craig, Acropoa spp.: Water Flow, Water Quality,
and Threatened Corals, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, Fall 2007, at 8, 9.
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this strategy depends on a scientifically credible basis for designating the
species as threatened. Moreover, the condition that protective regulations be
"necessary and advisable to provide for the conservation of such species" has
not been tested in a context like that suggested - i.e., to exclude one set of
causal factors, ostensibly because the cause, effect, and response associated
with them is so complex, so as to focus conservation resources on a more
manageable set of factors. Not surprisingly, therefore, this new approach,
while "creative and fresh,"' 30 is controversial, and would no doubt prove
doubly so if used as suggested for dealing with climate-threatened species.
2. Designating Critical Habitat
Section 4(a) of the ESA also requires that, "to the maximum extent prudent
and determinable [the FWS] shall, concurrently with making a determination
under paragraph (1) that a species is an endangered species or a threatened
species, designate any habitat of such species which is then considered to be
critical habitat."13' The statute defines critical habitat as:
(i) the specific areas within the geographical area occupied by the species,
at the time it is listed in accordance with the provisions of section 1533 of
this title, on which are found those physical or biological features (I)
essential to the conservation of the species and (II) which may require
special management considerations or protection; and
(ii) specific areas outside the geographical area occupied by the species at
the time it is listed in accordance with the provisions of section 1533 of
this title, upon a determination by the [FWS] that such areas are essential
for the conservation of the species.'
32
The critical habitat program has proven quite controversial. In addition to a
wave of suits involving missed statutory deadlines for critical habitat
designations, "both the protection provided by and the analysis required for
critical habitat designation are coming under increasing judicial scrutiny."'
133
Nevertheless, in the context of climate change, the critical habitat program
could lend considerable flexibility to the FWS in several respects.
130 Kass, supra note 127, at 133.
131 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(3)(A).
132 Id. § 1532(5)(A).
133 See Feldman & Brennan, supra note 45, at 88. The wave of litigation has become so
intense and costly that the FWS has described it as having nothing short of debilitating
effects on the agency's ability to carry out its conservation mission. The agency has long
believed that, "in most circumstances, the designation of 'official' critical habitat is of little
additional value for most listed species, yet it consumes large amounts of conservation
resources," and "that the present system for determining and designating critical habitat is
not working." Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Notice of Intent To Clarify
the Role of Habitat in Endangered Species Conservation, 64 Fed. Reg. 31,871, 31,872 (June
14, 1999).
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On the one hand, the provision allowing designation of specific areas
outside the geographical area occupied by the species if "essential for the
conservation of the species" may be an ideal way for FWS to respond
aggressively to ecological reshuffling. To the extent downscale models can
predict with reasonable certainty where a species might successfully migrate to
adapt to changes brought about by climate change, a credible interpretation of
the critical habitat provisions would allow the agency to "reserve" those areas
through critical habitat designations.1 34 This would provide an effective tool to
force human adaptation measures to minimize effects in such areas, thus
securing a greater chance for the species to withstand climate change
transitions and establish a viable population in its new ecological home.
On the other hand, several provisions also open the door to a more passive
approach. For example, the agency could justifiably conclude that designation
of critical habitat for species doomed by climate change fails to meet the
"prudent" standard, as the designation will provide no benefit. 135 Indeed, for a
doomed species, arguably there is no habitat "essential to the conservation of
the species," as conservation of the species is not possible. Even for species
that might be assisted through critical habitat designation, the complexities of
climate change could render the extent of such habitat "indeterminable,"
136
which would delay designation for up to one year after the species is listed.
1 37
134 The FWS took an approach like this with respect to the Preble's Meadow Jumping
Mouse, deciding to include small streams in the species' critical habitat, even though larger
streams are more important to the species, on the ground that "Preble's populations along
mountain streams may be less subject to certain threats including ... long-term climate
change." Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Designation of Critical Habitat
for the Preble's Meadow Jumping Mouse (Zapus hudsonius preblei), 68 Fed. Reg. 37,276,
37,285 (June 23, 2003) (codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17). On the other hand, it declined to do
so for the Spreading navarretia plant. A commenter suggested that the critical habitat
should "include areas of unoccupied suitable habitat that would provide for recovery
opportunities, including.., migration in response to climate change," but the agency merely
observed that "critical habitat designations do not signal that habitat outside the designation
is unimportant or may not be required for recovery." Endangered and Threatened Wildlife
and Plants; Designation of Critical Habitat for Navarretia fossalis (Spreading Navarretia),
70 Fed. Reg. 60,658, 60,662 (Oct 18, 2005) (codified at 50 C.F.R. pt 17).
3I The statute does not define "prudent." According to FWS regulations, designation of
critical habitat is not prudent if it "would not be beneficial to the species." 50 C.F.R. §
424.12(a)(1)(ii) (2006). Courts have examined "not prudent" determinations by the FWS
with a "hard look" review demanding more than conclusory statements and expecting that
such determinations will be rare. See LIEBESMAN & PETERSEN, supra note 7, at 20-21;
STANFORD ENVTL. LAW SOC'Y, supra note 7, at 64-66. No phenomenon operating on the
scale of climate change has been involved in those cases.
136 The statute does not define "indeterminable." According to FWS regulations, critical
habitat is indeterminable if "(i) Information sufficient to perform required analyses of the
impacts of the designation is lacking, or (ii) The biological needs of the species are not
sufficiently well known to permit identification of an area as critical habitat." 50 C.F.R. §
424.12(a)(2). This is the position the FWS has taken thus far with respect to the polar bear.
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In addition, the statute specifies that the FWS "shall designate critical
habitat, and make revisions thereto, under subsection (a)(3) ... on the basis of
the best scientific data available and after taking into consideration the
economic impact, the impact on national security, and any other relevant
impact, of specifying any particular area as critical habitat. 138 Based on this
analysis, the agency "may exclude any area from critical habitat if [the agency]
determines that the benefits of such exclusion outweigh the benefits of
specifying such area as part of the critical habitat, unless [the agency]
determines, based on the best scientific and commercial data available, that the
failure to designate such area as critical habitat will result in the extinction of
the species concerned. ' 139 The FWS could put together a credible case that a
designation of critical habitat for some climate-threatened species might so
extensively impede human adaptation to climate change as to warrant exercise
of its discretion not to act, assuming the case also can be made that extinction
is not therefore inevitable.
3. Formulating Recovery Plans
Section 4(f) of the ESA requires the FWS to "develop and implement plans
.. . 'recovery plans') for the conservation and survival of endangered species
and threatened species listed pursuant to this section, unless [the FWS] finds
that such a plan will not promote the conservation of the species."'140 The
agency must also "give priority to those endangered species or threatened
species, without regard to taxonomic classification, that are most likely to
benefit from such plans, particularly those species that are, or may be, in
conflict with construction or other development projects or other forms of
economic activity." 141 Arguably, this prioritization mandate speaks directly to
climate-threatened species which, perhaps only with the help of the ESA, could
survive the transition to stabilized climate regimes. On the other hand, one
striking aspect of the recovery plan program is that it specifically relieves the
FWS of any duty to prepare a plan if the agency finds that "a plan will not
promote the conservation of the species."'1 42 For a species essentially doomed
by climate change through stranding or other extreme effects, the FWS could
See Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; 12-Month Petition Finding and
Proposed Rule To List the Polar Bear (Ursus maritimus) as Threatened Throughout Its
Range, 72 Fed. Reg. 1064, 1096 (proposed Jan. 9, 2007) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17)
(citing 50 C.F.R. § 424.12(a)(2)).
131 See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(6)(C)(ii) (2000). At the end of that year, critical habitat must
be designated "to the maximum extent prudent." Id.
138 Id. § 1533(b)(2) (2000 & Supp. 2005). For a discussion of the "best scientific data
available" standard, see infra Part III.E.
139 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2) (2000 & Supp. 2005).
140 Id. § 1533(f)(1) (2000).
141 Id. § 1533(f)(1)(A).
142 Id. § 1533(0(1).
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justifiably reach such a finding and avoid expending agency resources
developing a plan for the species.
Even if the FWS does prepare a recovery plan for a climate-threatened
species, presumably on the premise that the ESA can help the species, it will
be of limited application as the courts have interpreted recovery plans to have
no mandatory effect on federal agencies, much less anyone else. 43 They are
plans, and that's it.
Nevertheless, recovery plans are not necessarily meaningless. They do
provide a wealth of information about a species and its road to recovery. 44
Although Professor Federico Cheever has meticulously chronicled the failure
of recovery planning to amount to anything in terms of enforceability,145 he
also has outlined the case for using recovery plans to guide implementation of
the other ESA programs, including those that do have regulatory force.
Professor Cheever's argument points to the influence recovery plans have had
on judicial determinations of such matters as whether an activity causes take,
whether an activity jeopardizes a species, and whether a species should be
reclassified from endangered to threatened. 146 Moreover, recovery plans can
help motivate and guide state, local, and private collaborative efforts to
respond to the effects of climate change on the species. 14 7 Through recovery
plans, therefore, the FWS may be able to influence how climate change effects
are viewed for species in the regulatory programs of the ESA - the take
prohibition, the jeopardy consultation program, and the HCP permit program -
.which are taken up in the next three sections of the Article.
143 See LIEBESMAN & PETERSEN, supra note 7, at 25-26; STANFORD ENVTL. LAW SOC'Y,
supra note 7, at 76-77.
144 For example, the FWS must incorporate in each plan:
(i) a description of such site-specific management actions as may be necessary to
achieve the plan's goal for the conservation and survival of the species;
(ii) objective, measurable criteria which, when met, would result in a determination, in
accordance with the provisions of this section, that the species be removed from the
list; and
(iii) estimates of the time required and the cost to carry out those measures needed to
achieve the plan's goal and to achieve intermediate steps toward that goal.
16 U.S.C. § 1533(f)(1)(B).
145 See Federico Cheever, Recovery Planning, the Courts and the Endangered Species
Act, 16 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 106, 108-10 (2001).
146 See id. at 110-11, 135.
141 See, e.g., Proposed Recovery Plan for the Evolutionarily Significant Unit (ESU) of
the Puget Sound Chinook Salmon, 70 Fed. Reg. 76,445, 76,447 (proposed Dec. 27, 2005)
(stating that integration of climate change effects in the recovery plan can "support recovery
actions to protect and restore local habitat conditions as a buffer against larger-scale
changes").
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B. Section 9: The Take Prohibition
Section 9(a)(1) of the ESA instructs that, except as provided elsewhere in
the ESA, 148 "with respect to any endangered species of fish or wildlife ... it is
unlawful for any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States to...
take any such species within the United States or the territorial sea of the
United States."' 49  Recognizing that this so-called "take prohibition" has
defined limits - it does not apply to plant species 150 and does not apply
automatically to threatened species of fish and wildlife1 51 - where applicable, it
takes effect sweepingly and with tremendous force. Persons subject to the
prohibition include all federal, state, and local governments and all private
organizations and individuals. 52 The prohibition applies "within the United
States," on public and private lands alike. And it applies to acts that "harass,
harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect" the protected
species. 53 Within that list of prohibited activities, the FWS and the NMFS
have defined "harm" to include any modification of the species' habitat - in
this case not limited to designated critical habitat - that "actually kills or
injures" the species members "by significantly impairing essential behavioral
patterns, including breeding, feeding, or sheltering."' 54 Although the United
States Supreme Court upheld this interpretation of the statute in Babbitt v.
Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon,155 the devil is in the
details in this instance.
The Sweet Home opinion took with one hand while it gave with the other,
limiting the breadth of the harm definition as much as it upheld the idea that
take extends to habitat losses. The harm definition projects the take
prohibition from cases in which the action causes direct death or injury (e.g.,
hunting, shooting, and trapping), to cases in which causality is indirect - i.e.,
loss of habitat leads in some way to actual death or injury. However, theories
of indirect take can become quite attenuated and speculative, in which case it
would be unreasonable to enforce the take prohibition's rebuttable presumption
against the activity as rigorously as in more obvious cases of direct take. For
example, assume that a developer's plan to build a subdivision would locate
new homes in an area within several hundred yards of habitat known to be
occupied by members of a protected bird species, but not actually in the
habitat. Opponents of the project may argue that some of the residents of the
new homes will have cats as pets, some of those cat owners will allow their
148 The incidental take permitting program is one such exception. See infra Part III.D. 1.
1"1 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1), (a)(1)(B) (2000).
150 Plants receive more limited protection. See id. § 1538(a)(2).
'"' As noted supra Part III.A.I, the listing agency may by rule extend some or all of the
take prohibition protections to threatened species. Id. § 1533(d).
152 All these entities fit the ESA's definition of "person." See id. § 1532(13).
153 Id. § 1532(19).
14 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2006) (FWS definition); id. § 222.102 (NMFS definition).
155 515 U.S. 687, 704 (1995).
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cats to wander outdoors, some of those cats may venture into the bird's habitat,
and some of those cats may eat birds, and some of those birds may be
individuals of the protected bird species. Anyone could speculate such
possibilities, and it would be unreasonable to impose the burden on the
developer of proving the postulated scenario is not possible.1
56
Rather, as the Court pronounced when it upheld the harm definition, in
many cases it is appropriate to impose the burden of proof on the proponent of
the indirect harm theory. Thus, the majority emphasized that the harm rule
incorporates "but for" causation, with "every term in the regulation's definition
of 'harm' . . . subservient to the phrase 'an act which actually kills or injures
wildlife."' 157 Furthermore, the term should "be read to incorporate ordinary
requirements of proximate causation and foreseeability."' 5 8 The majority thus
implicitly endorsed Sweet Home's "strong arguments that activities that cause
minimal or unforeseeable harm will not violate the [ESA] as construed. '159 In
her concurrence, Justice O'Connor was more direct, limiting the scope of the
harm rule to "significant habitat modification that causes actual, as opposed to
hypothetical or speculative, death or injury to identifiable protected
animals."' 60 Since the Court established these tort-like evidentiary burdens,
the lower courts have steadfastly refused to enforce the take prohibition based
on attenuated indirect take theories, but have enjoined case-specific instances
of take when death or injury was proven to be likely.
1 61
The stiff evidentiary and proof burdens Sweet Home imposed largely
explain why the government and citizen groups (through citizen suits) so
infrequently attempt to prosecute take violation claims.' 62 Prosecuting a
156 See Morrill v. Lujan, 802 F. Supp. 424, 430-31 (S.D. Ala. 1992) (rejecting an ESA
claim for injunctive relief based on this set of allegations). In settlement of another round of
litigation initiated following denial of the injunction request, the developer in Morrill
nonetheless agreed to prohibit house cats in the development. See William H. Satterfield et
al., Who's Afraid of the Big Bad Beach Mouse?, 8 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 13, 15 (1993)
(citing Developer Agrees To Protect Beach Mice, BIRMINGHAM NEWS, Jan. 19, 1993).
157 Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 700 n.13.
158 Id. at 696-97 n.9.
159 Id. at 699.
160 Id. at 708-09 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
161 For a thorough survey of the post-Sweet Home cases, see Glen & Douglas, supra note
48, at 68-69.
162 The handful of reported cases involving land uses are covered in Glen & Douglas,
supra note 48, passim. As they show, most Section 9 enforcement cases are brought by
citizen groups under the citizen suit provision of the ESA. A rare example of federal
government prosecution is United States v. Town of Plymouth, 6 F. Supp. 2d 81 (D. Mass.
1998), in which the government sued a city for failing to prevent its citizens from running
over a small endangered bird while riding ORVs along a public beach. Id. at 91-92. The
FWS and citizen groups have also prosecuted a number of Section 9 cases against water
diverters in western states. See James R. Rasband, Priority, Probability, and Proximate
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climate change case would be no mean feat either, given the generic effects of
greenhouse gas emissions and the imprecision of downscaling models.
Consider, for example, a scenario in which the pika is listed as endangered due
to climate change. Who is taking the pika? Are greenhouse gas emissions
from, say, a coal-fired power plant in Florida taking the pika? The plaintiff in
such a case would have to show that the power plant emissions are the actual
as well as proximate, foreseeable cause of the primary and secondary
ecological effects which are in turn the actual as well as proximate, foreseeable
cause of the pika's demise. 163 Proving that would prove too much, however, as
it would necessarily follow that all sources of greenhouse gases are taking the
pika. This is an inherent feature of the take prohibition that makes it inapposite
when take of a species occurs through large-scale, dispersed causal agents,
such as water consumption and pollution - if anyone is taking the species,
everyone is taking the species. Although nothing in the ESA prevents the FWS
from attempting to prosecute such a case, it would be a daunting prosecutorial
undertaking 164 as well as likely political suicide. 165 Thus far, the FWS has
Cause: Lessons from Tort Law About Imposing ESA Responsibility for Wildlife Harm on
Water Users and Other Joint Habitat Modifiers, 33 ENVTL. L. 595, 618-23, 628-30 (2003).
163 Even the Center for Biological Diversity, which has "push[ed] to use the ESA to fight
global warming," concedes that "any bid to fight the construction of a power plant by
arguing that emissions might harm a species would probably be thrown out of court,
because such climate-change effects remain speculative." Clayton, supra note 116
(reporting on an interview with Kieran Suckling, Policy Dir., Ctr. for Biological Diversity);
see also Brendan R. Cummings & Kassie R. Siegel, Ursus martimus: Polar Bears on Thin
Ice, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, Fall 2007, at 3, 7 (staff members of the Center for
Biological Diversity concede that "[w]hile it is clear that global warming affects listed
species, attributing an individual action's contribution to global warming is more difficult").
Difficulties in establishing actual and proximate causation permeate legal analyses of tort
and other liabilities associated with climate change. See David A. Grossman, Warming Up
to a Not-So Radical Idea: Tort-Based Climate Change Litigation, 28 COLUM. J. ENvTL. L. 1,
22-27 (2003).
16 The difficulty of prosecuting take prohibition claims in such dispersed take scenarios
has led some plaintiffs to simplify matters by suing state and local governments that
allegedly "authorize" the behavior under state or local law. For example, if a state
authorizes boating in state waters inhabited by an endangered species, the claim would be
that the state is vicariously liable for injuries boaters cause to the species. This strategy is,
not surprisingly, controversial and has had mixed results in the courts. See J.B. Ruhl, State
and Local Government Vicarious Liability under the ESA, 16 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 70,
71-73 (2001). It has never been applied successfully on a scale remotely approaching global
greenhouse gas emissions.
Another approach to simplify take prosecutions in dispersed aggregate causation settings
could be to single out only major sources of harm for prosecution seeking injunctive relief.
For example, in the western water diversion context, which often presents multiple diverters
having an aggregate impact on an aquatic species, the FWS or other plaintiff might select
major water diverters as the defendants to enjoin their future diversion of water. Professor
James Rasband criticizes this approach to the extent it follows anachronistic tort principles
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exhibited no stomach for it, 166 and in the long run may determine to use its
discretion - in this case prosecutorial discretion 167 - to leave greenhouse gas
emissions out of its take enforcement agenda.1
68
The take prohibition would prove more adept at enforcing discrete,
identifiable actions that make it less likely a climate-threatened species will
survive through the climate change transition. In particular, climate change is
likely to present collisions between many species, climate-threatened or not,
and human adaptations such as relocated agricultural and urban land uses,
technological structures designed to impede sea level rise and floods, and new
and intensified water diversions to sustain parched urban centers. Enforcement
of the take prohibition in such settings, where proximate cause may be less
difficult to establish, could help ensure that human adaptation measures do not
disregard the interests of imperiled species. In this sense, Section 9 would be
used no differently from the way it is already used - climate change effects
would simply be a reason to use it more vigilantly.
C. Section 7: Jeopardy Consultations
Section 7(a)(2) of the ESA provides:
Each Federal agency shall, in consultation with and with the assistance of
the Secretary, insure that any action authorized, funded, or carried out by
such agency (... "agency action") is not likely to jeopardize the
of joint and several liability with no right of contribution. Rasband suggests instead using
apportioned injunctive relief based on each defendant's priority of diversion under the
western appropriative rights system. See Rasband, supra note 162, at 637-44. As he points
out, however, as the number of diverters increases and the proportionate diversion of any
one decreases, more and more diverters must be joined in the suit in order to make a dent in
the total diversion of water from the aquatic ecosystem. See id. at 641-42. This effect
would be particularly acute in the case of greenhouse gas emissions. Neither joint and
several liability nor apportioned liability has been employed as a theory of liability in a
Section 9 prosecution based on greenhouse gas emissions as the alleged causal agent.
.6 See Rasband, supra note 162, at 638 (observing that prosecution of take violation
cases presents daunting proof complications and is politically unpopular).
166 For example, the agency does not identify greenhouse gas emissions in the list of
activities it believes could potentially result in a violation of Section 9 with regard to the
polar bear. See Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plans; 12-Month Petition Finding
and Proposed Rule To List the Polar Bear (Ursus maritimus) as Threatened Throughout Its
Range, 72 Fed. Reg. 1064, 1098 (proposed Jan. 9, 2007) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).
167 Prosecutorial discretion is relatively unbounded. See Heckler v. Chancy, 470 U.S.
821, 831 (1985) ("This Court has recognized on several occasions over many years that an
agency's decision not to prosecute or enforce, whether through civil or criminal process, is a
decision generally committed to an agency's absolute discretion.").
68 The FWS cannot generally prevent citizen groups from launching such an
enforcement effort, but the agency could do so in specific cases by listing a species as
threatened and limiting the scope of the take prohibition with respect to that species, as it is
authorized to do under Section 4(d) of the statute. See supra Part III.A.1.
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continued existence of any endangered species or threatened species or
result in the destruction or adverse modification of habitat of such species
which is determined ... to be critical .... 169
The statute builds an elaborate procedure for carrying out these
consultations under which the agency proposing the action must "consult" with
the FWS through a series of steps designed to predict the impact of the action
on listed species, with the ultimate product being a "biological opinion" from
the FWS "setting forth the [FWS's] opinion, and a summary of the information
on which the opinion is based, detailing how the agency action affects the
species or its critical habitat."
1 70
The substantive content for conducting the consultation analysis is defined
primarily in FWS regulations. "Jeopardize" is defined there as "to engage in
an action that reasonably would be expected, directly or indirectly, to reduce
appreciably the likelihood of both the survival and recovery of a listed species
in the wild by reducing the reproduction, numbers, or distribution of that
species.' 7 1 Five key regulatory definitions lay out the scope of effects that
must be considered to determine whether an action triggers that standard:
Action means "all activities or programs of any kind authorized, funded,
or carried out, in whole or in part, by Federal agencies in the United
States or upon the high seas."'
172
Effects of the action means "the direct and indirect effects of an action on
the species or critical habitat, together with the effects of other activities
that are interrelated or interdependent with that action, that will be added
to the environmental baseline.' '173
Environmental baseline means "the past and present impacts of all
Federal, State, or private actions and other human activities in the action
area, the anticipated impacts of all proposed Federal projects in the action
area that have already undergone formal or early section 7 consultation,
and the impact of State or private actions which are contemporaneous
with the consultation in process.'
7 4
Indirect effects are "those that are caused by the proposed action and are
later in time, but still are reasonably certain to occur."']
75
169 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2000). The provision also requires that "[i]n fulfilling the
requirements of this paragraph each agency shall use the best scientific and commercial data
available." Id. For discussion of the "best scientific data available" standard, see infra Part
III.E.
170 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(3)(A).
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Cumulative effects are "those effects of future State or private activities,
not involving Federal activities, that are reasonably certain to occur
within the action area of the Federal action subject to consultation.",
7 6
The FWS has issued no official guidance on climate change with respect to
the Section 7 jeopardy consultation program, but it takes no stretch of
imagination to fit climate change into this framework. Consider a project
being carried out, funded, or authorized by a federal agency, the construction
of which will remove habitat of a listed species and the operation of which will
emit greenhouse gases. The removal of habitat and emission of greenhouse
gases are clearly direct effects of the action added to the environmental
baseline, 177 both of which could have indirect effects that adversely affect the
species. At some later time, the habitat removal could adversely affect the
reproduction, numbers, or distribution of that species. Greenhouse gas
emissions contribute to tropospheric warming, and the secondary effects of
such warming could also, at some later time, adversely affect the species.
Moreover, other state and private activities emitting greenhouse gases may also
contribute to cumulative climate change effects that adversely affect the
species. In short, greenhouse gas emissions and their climate change
consequences both appear to be wrapped tightly into the framework for
consultations under Section 7(a)(2).178
To be sure, as with the listing decision, the FWS consultation decision
depends on a three-part causal chain: greenhouse gas emissions cause
tropospheric warming, which in turn causes secondary climate change effects,
which in turn cause ecological changes that adversely affect the species.
176 Id.
177 Because past emissions of greenhouse gases will contribute to future climate change,
see supra note 60, some increment of future climate change arguably already is within the
environmental baseline. Nevertheless, until aggregate global emissions fall to levels that
reduce tropospheric greenhouse gas concentrations to levels sufficient to arrest further
climate change, all present and future emissions add to the environmental baseline.
"' This reasoning is similar to guidance the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ)
issued in 1997 suggesting that the environmental impacts assessment process required of
federal actions under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) "provides an excellent
mechanism for consideration of ideas related to global climate change." Draft
Memorandum from Kathleen A. McGinty to Heads of Federal Agencies, Guidance
Regarding Consideration of Global Climatic Change in Environmental Documents Prepared
Pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act 1 (Oct. 8, 1997), available at
http://www.mms.gov/eppd/compliance/reports/ceqmemo.pdf. As CEQ explained:
The available scientific evidence ... indicates that climate change is "reasonably
foreseeable" impacts [sic] of emissions of greenhouse gases, as that phrase is
understood in the context of NEPA and CEQ regulations ....
Specifically, federal agencies must determine whether and to what extent their actions
affect greenhouse gases. Further, federal agencies must consider whether the actions
they take, [for example], the planning and design of federal projects, may be affected
by changes in the environment which might be caused by global climatic change.
Id. at 4. The CEQ has not issued further guidance or policy on the topic.
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Although determining whether these downscale effects actually occur may be
difficult to say in particular scenarios, the point is that they could occur.
Unless the FWS intends on ruling out that possibility entirely - a difficult
proposition after Massachusetts v. EPA - it stands to reason that consultations
under Section 7(a)(2) should consider the possible direct, indirect, and
cumulative effects of greenhouse gas emissions and climate change.
Indeed, one recent judicial opinion makes it clear that the FWS must at least
address the effects of climate change in jeopardy consultations. In Natural
Resources Defense Council v. Kempthorne,179 the FWS had prepared its
consultation report, known as a biological opinion (BiOp), regarding the
effects of the Central Valley Project-State Water Project (CVP-SWP) in
California on a small fish, the Delta smelt. 80 The BiOp's conclusions were
based in part on the assumption that the hydrology of the water bodies affected
by the project would follow historical patterns for the next 20 years.
181
Undercutting this assumption, a number of environmental groups directed
FWS's attention to several studies on the potential effects of climate change on
water supply reliability, urging that the issue be considered in the BiOp.
18 2
Reminiscent of the EPA's position in Massachusetts v. EPA, the FWS
attempted to defend its failure to consider climate change at all, as the court
summarized:
Defendants and Defendant-Intervenors respond by arguing (1) that the
evidence before FWS at the time the BiOp was issued was inconclusive
about the impacts of climate change; and (2) that, far from ignoring
climate change, the issue is built into the BiOp's analysis through the use
of [saline water condition data] as a proxy for the location and
distribution of Delta smelt. 1
83
But the court evidenced little tolerance for the agency's failure to address these
issues in the consultation documents:
[T]he climate change issue was not meaningfully discussed in the
biological opinion, making it impossible to determine whether the
information was rationally discounted because of its inconclusive nature,
or arbitrarily ignored ....
The BiOp does not gauge the potential effect of various climate change
scenarios on Delta hydrology. Assuming, arguendo, a lawful adaptive
management approach, there is no discussion when and how climate
179 506 F. Supp. 2d 322 (E.D. Cal. 2007).
180 Id. at 328.
181 Id. at 367.
182 Id. at 367-68.
183 Id. at 369.
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change impacts will be addressed, whether existing take limits will
remain, and the probable impacts on CVP-SWP operations.
FWS acted arbitrarily and capriciously by failing to address the issue of
climate change in the BiOp.
184
As did the majority in Massachusetts v. EPA, however, the Kempthorne
court made it clear that at this stage of the litigation "[t]here is no basis to
determine what weight FWS should ultimately give the climate change issue in
its analysis."' 185 The agency's error, in other words, was in not addressing
climate change at all. By contrast, once it has taken up the subject in a
consultation, the agency may have considerable latitude in evaluating the
indirect and cumulative effects of climate change, given that they must be
"reasonably certain to occur" and must "reasonably. . . be expected" to
jeopardize the species.
186
As with the Section 9 take prohibition, however, the problem with fitting
climate change into the consultation framework is that it exhibits more
certainty at macro levels than at micro levels. Consider, for example, the
proposed coal-fired power plant in Florida and its effects on the pika in the
Sierra Nevada Mountains.1 87 It would seem quite a stretch to conclude that the
power plant emissions will jeopardize the pika. Yet, at a macro level the
analysis is rather straight forward: the power plant emits greenhouse gases (a
direct effect of the action), greenhouse gases are reasonably certain to warm
the troposphere (an indirect effect of the action), a warming troposphere is
reasonably certain to adversely alter ecological conditions for the pika, and it is
reasonably expected that such ecological changes will bring an end to the pika.
At the micro level, however, it becomes difficult to link the individual plant's
emissions as the jeopardizing agent for the pika, given that all greenhouse gas
emissions worldwide are subject to the same macro analysis. Other than
quantity of emissions, the FWS would have no reasoned basis for
distinguishing between the power plant in Florida, a farm in Kansas, or an
184 Id. at 369-70.
185 Id. at 370 n.28.
186 See supra text accompanying notes 171, 174-75.
187 The considerable distance between the action and the species is not determinative.
The FWS consultation regulations define "action area" - the geographic scope of the
consultation analysis - as "all areas to be affected directly or indirectly by the Federal action
and not merely the immediate area involved in the action." 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (2006).
Thus, the analysis is not limited to the "footprint" of the action, nor is it limited by the
Federal agency's authority. Rather, it is a biological determination of the reach of the
proposed action on listed species. Subsequent analyses of the environmental baseline,
effects of the action, and levels of incidental take are based upon the action area. Id.
(defining "environmental baseline" and, by incorporation, "effects of the action" as based on
action area).
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elementary school in Oregon. 188 All have an adverse effect on the pika - and
some arguably have more of an effect - but given the small proportion of total
greenhouse gas emissions that each represents, the FWS can likely justify
finding that none of the emitting land uses jeopardizes the species.
Given these attributes of greenhouse gas emission effects on climate, it is
difficult to conceive of how the agency would go about aggressively regulating
greenhouse gas emissions through the jeopardy consultation program. The
FWS does not have the pollution control expertise of the EPA, nor does any
provision of the ESA explicitly provide authority to engage in emissions
regulation. Given that all emission sources contribute to warming effects, the
threat of jeopardy findings would have to be applied universally to all sources.
This, in turn, might induce emission sources to engage in emission offsets
(e.g., by purchasing forestation credits) or technological and operational
emission reductions. But is the FWS equipped to assume the role of nation-
wide regulator of farms, industrial facilities, auto emissions, and everything
else? In short, the idea that all emission sources present jeopardy conditions to
each and every climate-threatened species would prove too much, and likely
render the ESA and the FWS political targets in the first degree.
On the other hand, the climate change issue in Kempthorne did not involve
analysis of the indirect effects of a project's greenhouse gas emissions, but
rather focused on how the cumulative effects of climate change will influence
the effects of a project on a protected species. 189 The FWS evaluated the
effects of the project on the smelt assuming no change in hydrology relevant to
the smelt, but there was evidence that climate change could adversely affect
hydrological conditions for the smelt in a way that could have altered the
consultation effects analysis. The effect of Kempthorne is to require that
where downscale modeling and field observations indicate it is "reasonably
certain" that climate change will lead to changes in ecological conditions to the
detriment of a protected species, the FWS must engage in a consultation to
determine whether the project, taking those changes into account as cumulative
effects, is "reasonably expected" to jeopardize the species. The FWS may in
many cases point to the difficulty of downscaling climate change effects to
support a no-jeopardy finding, 190 but that does not absolve it of the duty to
conduct the analysis.
188 Staff members of the Center for Biological Diversity have suggested that federal
actions contributing "appreciable amounts" of greenhouse gases - whether individual
actions, such as approval of a large coal fired power plant, or aggregate actions, such as
setting fuel standards for SUVs - are appropriate for Section 7 consultations. See
Cummings & Siegel, supra note 163, at 7. They do not, however, provide a rationale for
drawing the line between "appreciable" and "not appreciable," nor do they offer a basis for
not subjecting all emissions to consultation given that all contribute to climate change.
189 See Kempthorne, 506 F. Supp. 2d at 368-70.
190 Many commentators have argued that the ESA inherently demands implementation
under an implied background principle of affirmative conduct favoring conservation of
protected species. The most prominent example is found in the 1995 report of the National
20081
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Like the EPA under the Clean Air Act, therefore, the FWS has no room to
dodge its mandate to consider the effects of climate change in consultations
under Section 7(a)(2) of the ESA. The fact that most consultations will not
reach a jeopardy finding based on the indirect effects of the action's
greenhouse gas emissions or the cumulative effects of climate change is beside
Academy of Sciences' National Research Council (NRC), in which NRC engaged in a top-
to-bottom review of the role of science in ESA decision making and concluded, among
other things, that the precautionary principle should be applied in ESA contexts so as to
impose the burden of proving no harm on the proponent of an action. See NAT'L RESEARCH
COUNCIL, supra note 118, at 169. Indeed, some passages of the legislative history of the
jeopardy consultation provisions suggest that Congress believed the FWS and the NMFS
should, or at least could, "give the benefit of the doubt to the species" when information is
not conclusive, as might often be the case with respect to climate change effects. See H.R.
CONF. REP. No. 96-697, at 12 (1979), as reprinted in 1979 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2557, 2576. In
these and other decision-making settings, where incomplete or inconclusive information
requires the agency to make a close call, several courts have also endorsed the idea of giving
the benefit of the doubt to the species. See, e.g., Conner v. Burford, 848 F.2d 1441, 1451-54
(9th Cir. 1988) (requiring the FWS to "give the benefit of the doubt to the species" when the
FWS concluded that there was "insufficient information available to render a
comprehensive biological opinion" concerning oil and gas leases); Defenders of Wildlife v.
Babbitt, 958 F. Supp. 670, 677, 680 (D.D.C. 1997) (stating that the FWS must "give 'the
benefit of the doubt to the species"' and list the Canada Lynx despite the FWS's claim that
there was not "substantial information that the southern Rocky Mountain population of the
Canada lynx meets the definition of a 'species"'). Also, the NMFS has on occasion
announced in listing and jeopardy consultation decisions that it would provide that benefit
of the doubt to the species or, in the same spirit, would "err on the side of the species." See,
e.g., Regulations Governing the Approach to Humpback Whales in Alaska, 66 Fed. Reg.
29,502 (May 31, 2001) (codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 224) (promulgating regulations under the
ESA governing treatment of listed whales, in part to implement a precautionary principle
approach); Endangered and Threatened Species; Endangered Status for Snake River
Sockeye Salmon, 56 Fed. Reg. 58,619 (Nov. 20, 1991) (codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 22)
(deciding to list a population of salmon notwithstanding uncertainty as to whether it was
genetically distinct from other populations); Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., Section 7
Consultation Biological Opinion for Bering Sea/Aleutian Islands Groundfish Fisheries 133
(Oct. 19, 2001) (explaining that the agency conducted the consultation by at all times giving
the "benefit of the doubt" to the species); Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., Section 7
Consultation Biological Opinion on Atlantic Highly Migratory Species Fishery
Management Plan 99 (June 14, 2001) (explaining that in selecting takes of turtles from
specified activities the agency would "err on behalf of the species"); see also Or. Natural
Res. Council v. Daley, 6 F. Supp. 2d 1139, 1149 (D. Or. 1998) (quoting an NMFS official's
rationale for recommending listing of a population of salmon as being the "err on the side of
the species" principle). But it is clear that the statute imposes no such default rule, and the
agencies have not officially adopted one as formal policy. Saying that the FWS and the
NMFS may err on the side of the species in the face of inconclusive evidence, including in
the case of climate change effects, does not mean that they must. See infra Part III.E
(discussing the "best scientific data available" standard).
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the point - most consultations already do not reach jeopardy findings. 191
Conducting the climate change analyses, however, will improve knowledge
about the effects of climate change on species and, thus, is by no means a
waste of agency resources.
D. Section 10: Incidental Take Permits and Experimental Populations
Section 10 of the ESA contains a hodge-podge of permitting programs and
other exceptions to the proscriptions found elsewhere in the statute, primarily
the Section 9 take prohibition. Two such programs that are likely to be at the
center of the agency's climate change policy are the incidental take permit
program and the experimental populations program.
1. Adaptive Management Provisions of Incidental Take Permits
Section 10(a) of the ESA establishes a procedure under which the FWS may
approve take of listed species otherwise prohibited under Section 9 for actions
that are incidental to otherwise lawful actions and not subject to the Section 7
jeopardy consultation process. 192 To seek approval, an applicant must submit a
habitat conservation plan (HCP), describing the project and its impact on the
species. 193 The agency must then find that the HCP ensures that "the applicant
will, to the maximum extent practicable, minimize and mitigate the impacts of
such taking" and that "the taking will not appreciably reduce the likelihood of
the survival and recovery of the species in the wild."'194 Because the FWS's
issuance of an HCP permit is a federal action within the meaning of the
Section 7(a)(2) jeopardy consultation, the reasoning of the Kempthorne case
outlined above in Part III.C will carry over to the environmental assessment
process for HCP permits. The HCP program contains the additional
requirement that the applicant will "minimize and mitigate" the incidental take
impacts "to the maximum extent practicable." If the FWS took the great leap
of characterizing greenhouse gas emissions as causing take of climate-
threatened species under Section 9, the agency could assert that applicants
191 From 1998-2001, the FWS conducted over 300,000 consultations, the vast majority of
which resulted in findings that the action would not adversely affect the species or that, if
there was an effect, it would not jeopardize the species. See U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV.,
CONSULTATIONS WITH FEDERAL AGENCIES: SECTION 7 OF THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 2
(2007), available at http://www.fws.gov/endangered/pdfs/consultations.pdf.
192 For a concise but comprehensive overview of the structure, history, and policy of the
HCP program, see generally Robert D. Thornton, Habitat Conservation Plans: Frayed
Safety Nets or Creative Partnerships?, 16 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 94 (2001). Actions
that must track through the jeopardy consultation process can receive incidental take
authorization in connection with the consultation pursuant to "reasonable and prudent
measures that [FWS] considers necessary and appropriate to minimize such impact." See 16
U.S.C. § 1536(b)(4)(ii) (2000).
193 See 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(A) (2000).
19' Id. § 1539(a)(2)(B)(ii), (iv).
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must reduce or offset greenhouse gas emissions to satisfy this demand, using
the "maximum extent practicable" standard to moderate what is expected.
Even if greenhouse gases are kept off the table as a regulatory target, the
"minimize and mitigate" requirement could limit overbearing effects of human
adaptation to climate change for land uses requiring an HCP permit.
Another wrinkle of the HCP program arises under the so-called No
Surprises policy for HCP permits Under this controversial process, a permittee
is relieved of the need to address "unforeseen circumstances" but must agree to
manage and respond to the effects of "changed circumstances" identified in the
permit documents. 95 Under No Surprises, the FWS provides participants in an
approved, properly implemented HCP the assurance that the Service will not
impose additional mitigation requirements in the event that unforeseen
circumstances negatively impact the species over time. 196  Unforeseen
circumstances means changes affecting an HCP covered species or geographic
area that could not reasonably have been anticipated by plan developers and
the Service at the time of the plan's development, and that result in a
substantial and adverse change in the status of the covered species.197
On the other hand, the No Surprises rule recognizes that plan developers and
the Service can reasonably anticipate and plan for some changes in
circumstances affecting a species or geographic area covered by an HCP (e.g.,
the listing of new species, or a fire or other natural catastrophic event in areas
prone to such events).' 9 To the extent such changed circumstances are
provided for in the HCP's operating conservation program, the permittee must
implement the appropriate measures in response to the changed
circumstances. 199 Often these response measures are detailed and provided for
under the permit provisions dealing with "adaptive management. '"200
"I See Habitat Conservation Plan Assurances ("No Surprises") Rule, 63 Fed. Reg. 8859
(Feb. 23, 1998) (codified at 50 C.F.R. §§ 17.22, 17.32 (2006)). The policy has been
described as an essential component of the HCP program, necessary to make HCPs
attractive to landowners. See Fred P. Bosselman, The Statutory and Constitutional Mandate
for a No Surprises Policy, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 707, 717-19 (1997). The No Surprises policy,
then rule, has been the subject of intense procedural and substantive legal challenges. See,
e.g., Spirit of the Sage Council v. Norton, 294 F. Supp. 2d 67, 92 (D.D.C. 2003) (finding the
rule was not procedurally valid). Recently, however, the court presiding over the litigation
found that all procedural defects had been corrected and deemed the rule substantively valid
under the ESA. See Spirit of the Sage Council v. Kempthorne, 511 F. Supp. 2d 31, 44-46
(D.D.C. 2007).
196 See 50 C.F.R. § 17.22(b)(5)(iii).
'9' See id. § 17.3.
198 These are known as "changed circumstances." Id.
'99 See id. § 17.22(b)(5)(i).
200 Under adaptive management, regulators use models of natural resource systems to
develop performance measurements and initial policy choices, but build into the regulatory
implementation framework a process for continuous monitoring, evaluation, and adjustment
of decisions and practices:
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The FWS has not directly addressed the issue of how climate change and
greenhouse gas emissions play out under the unforeseen circumstances/
changed circumstances dichotomy. In the preamble to the rule as adopted in
1998, however, the FWS (with the NMFS) responded to comments raising the
topic:
The concept of adaptive management promotes the notion that management policies
should be flexible and should incorporate new information as it becomes available.
New management actions should build upon the results of previous experiments in an
iterative process. It stresses the continuous use of scientific information and
monitoring to help organizations and policies change appropriately to achieve specific
environmental and social objectives.
NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE MISSOURI RIVER ECOSYSTEM: EXPLORING THE PROSPECTS
FOR RECOVERY 18-19 (2002). There is broad consensus today among resource managers
and academics that adaptive management is the only practical way to implement ecosystem
management policy. See Ronald D. Brunner & Tim W. Clark, A Practice-Based Approach
to Ecosystem Management, 11 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 48, 56 (1997); Anne E.
Heissenbuttel, Ecosystem Management - Principles for Practical Application, 6
ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 730, 730 (1996); Paul L. Ringold et al., Adaptive Monitoring
Design for Ecosystem Management, 6 ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 745, 746 (1996). Indeed,
the Ecological Society of America's comprehensive study of ecosystem management treats
the use of adaptive management methods as a given. See Norman L. Christensen, The
Report of the Ecological Society of America Committee on the Scientific Basis for
Ecosystem Management, 6 ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 665, 666 (1996). Appropriately,
therefore, the FWS has announced it will administer HCP permits, where gaps in
information can run high, using adaptive management as a means to "examine alternative
strategies for meeting measurable biological goals and objectives through research and/or
monitoring, and then, if necessary, to adjust future conservation management actions
according to what is learned." See Notice of Availability of a Draft Addendum to the Final
Handbook for Habitat Conservation Planning and Incidental Take Permitting Process, 64
Fed. Reg. 11,485, 11,486-87 (Mar. 9, 1999). HCPs thus are acknowledged to be working
hypotheses of how species will respond to changes in habitat size, location, configuration,
and quality. To truly integrate adaptive management into an HCP, the plan must include a
monitoring program to evaluate the performance of mitigation measures and a system that
automatically triggers alternative conservation actions in the event that performance fails to
meet conservation goals. Gregory A. Thomas, Incorporating Adaptive Management and the
Precautionary Principle into HCP Design, 18 ENDANGERED SPECIES UPDATE 32, 33 (2001);
George F. Wilhere, Adaptive Management in Habitat Conservation Plans, 16
CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 20, 22 (2002). The FWS has thus portrayed adaptive management
as an important practical tool that "can assist the Services and the applicant in developing an
adequate operating conservation program and improving its effectiveness." See Notice of
Availability of a Final Addendum to the Handbook for Habitat Conservation Planning and
Incidental Take Permitting Process, 65 Fed. Reg. 35,242, 35,252 (June 1, 2000). For in-
depth discussions of the integration of adaptive management into the HCP program, see
generally Holly Doremus, Adaptive Management, the Endangered Species Act, and the
Institutional Challenges of "New Age" Environmental Protection, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 50,
68-74 (2001) [hereinafter Doremus, Adaptive Management], and J.B. Ruhl, Regulation by
Adaptive Management - Is It Possible, 7 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 21 (2005).
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Issue 7: Many commenters stated that the applicant is legally required to
address all unforeseen circumstances in the HCP pursuant to section 10.
They noted that fire, disease, drought, flood, global climate change, and
non-point source pollution may be unforeseen, but are not uncommon....
In addition, commenters noted that the nature of many of the HCPs that
the Services are approving increases the likelihood for unforeseen events
to happen (i.e., the permits are issued for many years and cover large
areas and many species).
Response 7: The Services disagree that HCPs must address all
hypothetical future events, no matter how remote the probability that they
may occur. Rather, the Services believe that only reasonably foreseeable
changes in circumstances need to be addressed in an HCP. Moreover,
these circumstances are likely to vary from HCP to HCP given the ever
changing mix of species and affected habitats covered by a given
plan .... [U]nforeseen circumstances will only include events that could
not reasonably have been anticipated. All reasonably foreseeable
circumstances, including natural catastrophes that normally occur in the
area, should be addressed in the HCP.
20 1
By incorporating a "reasonably foreseeable" standard, the FWS thus opened
the door to the same kind of framework the Kempthorne court adopted for
consultations under Section 7(a)(2): the FWS must consider climate change
when evaluating an HCP, and from there any reasonably foreseeable ecological
effects should be taken into account under the changed circumstances category,
not the unforeseen circumstances category. For long-term HCPs authorizing
ongoing effects over decades, such as an industrial facility or regional
development plan, a regime of adaptive management measures can be designed
to integrate the capacity for the project to adjust operations and other
parameters over time in response to the reasonably foreseeable climate change
effects.20 2 Even short-term projects, such as small subdivision developments,
201 Habitat Conservation Plan Assurances ("No Surprises") Rule, 63 Fed. Reg. 8859,
8863 (Feb. 23, 1998) (codified at 50 C.F.R. §§ 17.22, 17.32 (2006)).
202 Some commentators posit that the No Surprises approach may constrain the use of
adaptive management, as it cuts off revision of prior agreements about the HCP's
conservation measures. See Doremus, Adaptive Management, supra note 200, at 72-73. On
the other hand, one might just as reasonably complain that adaptive management
undermines the No Surprises policy, as its very purpose is to ensure the ability to adjust
decisions after the HCP is issued. In fact, the two approaches seem to me to be
complementary, not conflicting. The No Surprises policy simply defines who is responsible
for measures necessary to address unforeseen circumstances, and a comprehensive, criteria-
specific adaptive management provision in an HCP negates the argument that matters
contemplated as the subject of adaptive management were unforeseen for purposes of the
No Surprises policy. It should therefore be in the interests of both the agency and the
applicant to negotiate an adaptive management provision that spells out its scope and
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may rely on long-term mitigation measures, such as habitat preserves, which
may be influenced by climate change and which therefore should integrate
long-term adaptive management measures.
2. Assisted Migration Through Experimental Populations
My earlier observation that pikas cannot fly away from the mountaintop
predicament, but that we might fly them away, was not meant to be facetious.
The emerging topic of assisted migration posits just that - move stranded
species away from their degrading natural habitat to suitable habitat located
beyond the species' migratory capacity. Ironically, it may be the case that this
suitable habitat is not "natural" to where it is located, but rather has been
forming far outside the doomed species' range because of climate change.
The agency appears to have the authority to engage in assisted migration.
Section 10(j) of the ESA allows the FWS to transport and release members of
an endangered or threatened species to areas outside its current range as an
"experimental population," if the agency "determines that such release will
further the conservation of such species. '203 The release must be to an area
that contains suitable natural habitat within the "probable historic range" of the
species, unless such habitat has been destroyed, in which case the release may
be to areas not formerly occupied by the species. 2° 4 A species losing habitat
within its current and historic range because of climate change effects, but
which at the same time is gaining habitat outside its historic range because of
climate change, appears to fit these conditions, though there is no instance in
which the FWS (or the NMFS) has exercised this option with respect to a
species listed under the ESA because of threats resulting from climate change.
E. The Ubiquitous "Best Science" Standard
As an intersection between biological science and law, the reliability of
decision making under the ESA necessarily depends on the quantity and
quality of scientific information available to and used by the decision makers.
The ESA could hardly operate on less than robust and reliable scientific data.
But what is the agency supposed to do about defining, obtaining, and
evaluating the universe of data about climate change and its effects in order to
subject matter with clarity and precision, including the reasonably foreseeable effects of
climate change.
203 16 U.S.C. § 1539(j)(2)(A) (2000). Authorization for an agency or organization
relocating the population is obtained under Section 10(a)(1)(A) of the ESA, which provides
for the FWS to grant permits "to enhance the propagation or survival of the affected species,
including, but not limited to, acts necessary for the establishment and maintenance of
experimental populations." Id. § 1539(a)(1)(A). The "but not limited to" language of this
permitting provision suggests other potential applications may arise in connection with
enhancing the survival of climate-threatened species. Id.
204 See 50 C.F.R. § 17.8 1(a) (2006).
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make its substantive decisions under the listing, take prohibition, consultation,
and HCP programs? What is its decision-making method to be?
The ESA's answer is the so-called "best scientific data available" standard,
which permeates several of the statute's major programs. For example, when
deciding whether to list a species, the FWS and NMFS must consider factors
such as loss of habitat 20 5 using only "the best scientific and commercial data
available. '20 6 Similarly, the biological component of the decision whether to
designate critical habitat must use the "best scientific data available. '20 7 And
the "no jeopardy" and "no adverse modification" directives to federal agencies
adopt the same standard. 20 8 Although the ESA leaves this "best scientific data
available" standard of evidentiary quality undefined,20 9 in Bennett v. Spear2 10 a
majority of the Supreme Court suggested that its "obvious purpose ... is to
ensure that the ESA not be implemented haphazardly, on the basis of
speculation or surmise" and "to avoid needless economic dislocation produced
by agency officials zealously but unintelligently pursuing their environmental
objectives. '2 11 It can act, in other words, as a check on both the hasty
application of regulatory power and the uninformed use of science.
Accordingly, the courts have interpreted it to impose several practical
guidelines on the agencies:
2 12
* The agencies may not manipulate their decisions by unreasonably
relying on certain sources to the exclusion of others.
- The agencies may not disregard scientifically superior evidence.2 13
205 See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(l)(A) (2000).
206 Id. § 1533(b)(1)(A).
207 See id. § 1533(a)(3), (b)(2).
208 See id. § 1536(c); 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(g)(8) (2006).
209 Although several other environmental statutes use the phrase or something close to it,
all leave it undefined. See Michael J. Brennan et al., Square Pegs and Round Holes:
Application of the "Best Scientific Data Available" Standard in the Endangered Species
Act, 16 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 387, 402 n.81 (2003) (collecting statutes); Holly Doremus, Listing
Decisions Under the Endangered Species Act: Why Better Science Isn't Always Better
Policy, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 1029, 1034 n.9 (1997) (collecting statutes) [hereinafter Doremus,
Listing Decisions].
210 520 U.S. 154 (1997).
211 Id. at 176-77.
212 See Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Norton, Civ. No. 98-934 (RMU/JMF), 2002
WL 1733618, at *8-9 (D.D.C. July 29, 2002) (summarizing the existing body of case law).
See generally Brennan et al., supra note 209, at 396-430; Laurence Michael Bogert, That's
My Story and I'm Stickin' To It: Is the "Best Available" Science Any Available Science
Under the Endangered Species Act?, 31 IDAHO L. REV. 85 (1994); Doremus, Listing
Decisions, supra note 209, at 1051-85; John Earl Duke, Note, Giving Species the Benefit of
the Doubt, 83 B.U. L. REV. 209 (2003).
213 Sw. Ctr., 2002 WL 1733618, at *8.
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- Relatively minor flaws in scientific data do not render that information
unreliable.
214
- The agencies must use the best data available, not the best data
possible.
2' 5
- The agencies may not insist on conclusive data in order to make a
decision.
21 6
- The agencies are not required to conduct independent research to
improve the pool of available data.
217
- The agencies thus must rely on even inconclusive or uncertain
information if that is the best available at the time of the decision.
2 18
- The agencies must manage and consider the data in a transparent
administrative process.
219
Similarly, in 1994 the FWS and NMFS issued a joint policy providing
guidelines for how the agencies will ensure their ESA decisions incorporate
this evidentiary standard.220 The policy directs the agencies to follow six
guidelines in ESA implementation decisions (including species listing,
jeopardy consultations, and incidental take authorizations):
- Require that all biologists evaluate all scientific and other information
that will be used to make the decision;
- Gather and impartially evaluate biological, ecological, and other
information that disputes official positions, decisions, and actions
proposed or taken by the FWS or NMFS;
- Ensure that biologists document their evaluation of information that
supports or does not support a position being proposed by the agency;
- Use primary and original sources of information as the basis for
consultation decisions or recommendations;
- Adhere to the timeframes or "schedules" established by the ESA; and
214 Id. (citing Bldg. Indus. Ass'n of Superior Cal. v. Norton, 247 F.3d 1241, 1246-47
(D.C. Cir. 2001)).
215 Id.
216 See id. at *9.
217 See id. (citing Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Babbitt, 215 F.3d 58 (D.C. Cir.
2000))
218 See id.
219 See Doremus, Listing Decisions, supra note 209, at 1084-87.
220 Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants: Notice of Interagency Cooperative
Policy on Information Standards Under the Endangered Species Act, 59 Fed. Reg. 34,271,
34,271 (July 1, 1994).
221 Id.
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- Conduct management-level review of documents developed by the
agency to verify and assure the quality of the science used to establish
official positions.
All that sounds impressive, but the question arises whether appending
"best," "scientific," and "available" to the general standards of administrative
review makes any appreciable difference in the substantive discretion the
agency enjoys. 222 After all, the default rules already are provided in the
conventional judicial review provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA), under which any court would routinely find that an agency's reliance
on sloppy, biased, or haphazard evidence is arbitrary and capricious. 22 3 It is
difficult to pinpoint the incremental legal effect, if any, the "best scientific data
available" standard adds to that baseline. On the one hand, the courts behave
as if the standard means something,224 yet it is not clear that any of the rulings
based on the standard would have turned out differently under the conventional
APA judicial review tests. It is not possible to extract from case law,
administrative policy, or legislative intent any independent mandate of agency
decision-making method or standard of judicial review the provision adds to
222 1 have examined this question in more detail elsewhere. See J.B. Ruhl, Is the
Endangered Species Act Ecopragmatic?, 87 MINN. L. REv. 885, 927-29 (2003); Ruhl,
Methodology, supra note 110, at 579-84.
223 The conventional rules of judicial review - the default rules when the agency's
organic act is silent - are found in the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). 5 U.S.C. § 706
(2000). These rules require the courts to apply considerable deference to the agency's
decision. A reviewing court may not substitute its judgment for the agency's, but must
undertake a "thorough, probing, in-depth review" of the agency's decision. Citizens to
Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415-16 (1971). Thus, a court will reject
an agency's decision if it is "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law." 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); see, e.g., Biodiversity Legal Found. v.
Babbitt, 146 F.3d 1249, 1252 (10th Cir. 1998). An agency decision is arbitrary and
capricious if the agency has either "relied on factors which Congress had not intended it to
consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an
explanation... counter to the evidence... or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed
to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise," or if it has failed to "articulate a
satisfactory explanation for its action including a 'rational connection between the facts
found and the choice made."' Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). The ESA has been widely interpreted as being subject to these
rules with no substantial exceptions. See, e.g., Am. Wildlands v. Norton, 193 F. Supp. 2d
244, 251 (D.D.C. 2002); Loggerhead Turtle v. County Council of Volusia County, 120 F.
Supp. 2d 1005, 1013 (M.D. Fla. 2000); Friends of the Wild Swan, Inc. v. U.S. Fish &
Wildlife Serv., 945 F. Supp. 1388, 1394 (D. Or. 1996).
224 See, e.g., Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Norton, Civ. No. 98-934 (RMU/JMF),
2002 WL 1733618, at *8-9 (D.D.C. July 29, 2002) (discussing at length the meaning of the
"best evidence standard").
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the picture. 225 Nor does commentary on the standard suggest that it imposes
higher duties.
226
On the other hand, if it does establish anything, the standard acknowledges
that the FWS is the expert science agency when it comes to defining threats to
species and the measures needed for conservation of species.227 Hence, while
the FWS is not the nation's expert science agency on the physical causes and
consequences of climate change, it should be responsible for being the
repository of knowledge and research on the biological effects of climate
change on species. Whether it is through the "best available scientific
evidence" standard or through plain vanilla APA judicial deference, if the
agency lives up to that responsibility, its exercise of discretion within the
bounds detailed above should be respected.
The "best scientific data available" standard can be flexibly employed by the
FWS to carry out either a passive or aggressive climate change policy. After
Massachusetts v. EPA, the FWS, like any other regulatory agency, would be
hard-pressed to plead "scientific uncertainty" in taking the position that species
are not threatened by climate change and thus no FWS responsibilities are
triggered by the ESA. Indeed, the Kempthorne court rejected that position in
no uncertain terms. In its effort to force the FWS to consider the effects of
climate change in the biological opinion covering the Central Valley Project,
the plaintiff environmental group had argued that "[r]egardless of the
uncertainty involved in predicting the consequences of climate change, FWS
had an obligation under the ESA to address the probable effects on Delta
smelt. ' '228 The defendant water contractors responded that Bennett v. Spear
"intended to preclude exactly this kind of argument." 229 The district court
rebuffed that interpretation of Bennett, explaining that the Bennett Court held
only "that persons who are economically burdened by a decision made under
the ESA fall within the zone of interests the statute protects for the purposes of
standing." 23° The district court opined further that "Bennett sheds little light onthe current inquiry - whether and to what extent the data that was before the
225 For example, courts have been reluctant to uphold challenges to the substance of FWS
jeopardy opinions based on allegations that the best available science standard adds some
special kick to the default rules of the APA. See Katherine Renshaw, Leaving the Fox To
Guard the Henhouse: Bringing Accountability to Consultation Under the Endangered
Species Act, 32 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 161, 172-81 (2007).
226 See, e.g., LIEBESMAN AND PETERSEN, supra note 7, at 16 (discussing the standard in
the context of the basic APA judicial review criteria); Brennan et al., supra note 209, at 412-
32 (thorough review of cases interpreting the "best scientific data available" standard).
227 See, e.g., Loggerhead Turtle, 120 F. Supp. 2d at 1023 ("Where there is a substantial
volume of research, data, and comments, the agency exercises its expertise to make a
reasonable decision based on all of the data and information.").
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FWS regarding climate change should have been considered and addressed in
the [biological opinion].
231
Yet, assuming the agency must peer into the climate change blender, the
FWS has substantial leeway as to what it sees; downscaling global and
regional models of climate change impacts to specific species and their local
ecological contexts is difficult and, on this score, the FWS is the expert
agency. Provided the agency acts within its statutory bounds by considering
climate change where it must or may, engaging the available downscaling
science, and assessing its application to a particular species with the air of its
expert position evident in the record, courts will be hard-pressed to look behind
the agency's conclusion one way or the other. This applies to questions
regarding the level of threat climate change poses to a species, the areas
appropriate for designation as critical habitat for a species threatened or
endangered by climate change, and the effects of a proposed land use on such a
species. Of course, as the downscaling science becomes "better" and more
"available," the agency will be more constrained in this regard, having to
acknowledge greater or less uncertainty where it plainly exists, but
environmental or industry groups will have to establish that in the courts case
by case. Overall, therefore, the "best scientific data available" standard
appears to provide the FWS a background source of discretion that may, for
the foreseeable future, be quite substantial in scope and useful to the agency in
shaping policy choices under each of the ESA's primary programs.
IV. USING THE ESA To CARRY SPECIES TO THE NO-ANALOG FUTURE
The task ahead of the FWS is daunting, and it must use the discretion
outlined in Part III to develop a plan soon, lest climate change sweep away its
mission along with its charges. As Part I explained, manifestations of climate
change already are well underway and already have had adverse impacts on
some species. More can be expected. Indeed, the FWS must assume that more
climate change impacts will unfold even if the global community takes
measures to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions. As Part II demonstrated, this
assumption poses complex policy questions for the FWS, though Part III
showed that the agency has considerable flexibility in how it answers them. It
has the discretion, within bounds, to adopt passive or aggressive policies for
how to integrate climate change in ESA programs.
With that foundation established, what should define the agency's set of
operating assumptions about how the global community responds generally to
climate change - pessimism or optimism? A worst case scenario would have
the global community utterly fail to contain greenhouse gas emissions and, as a
result, climate change spiraling into chaos for centuries. In that scenario, the
FWS might as well pack up its bags and close shop, as climate change will
become an unassailable force in ecological reshuffling, overwhelming any
231 Id.
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management of ecosystems or species. Exercising the ESA, in other words, is
pointless in this scenario.
On the other hand, the agency also cannot afford to assume a Pollyanna
future in which the global community comes together tomorrow, drastically
reduces emissions, somehow sucks carbon dioxide out of the troposphere, and
reaches 1990 overall levels by the end of this decade. The message of
Massachusetts v. EPA is that a regulatory agency can't assume someone else
will address the climate change problem. Each agency must "whittle away"
with whatever knife Congress has provided it.
The ESA will be best served if the FWS adopts a cautious optimism that
recognizes the limits of the ESA but keeps the statute relevant. Conceding that
some human-induced climate change is inevitable even in the best of
circumstances does not concede that it will be perpetual and chaotic. Rather,
the FWS can reasonably assume that the global community will eventually
arrest greenhouse gas emissions to a benchmark level and that, as a
consequence, climate regimes will eventually settle into a new "natural"
pattem of variation.2 32 We have no analog for what that pattern will be, and
the transition from the present to that future will be, by all appearances, a
rocky ride, but in all probability we will get there. The job of the ESA is to
help as many species as is reasonably possible get there with us - to serve as
their bridge across the climate change transition into the no-analog future.
Ironically, to do this will take some humility and restraint. Going for the
jugular by regulating greenhouse gas emissions is not where the ESA can be of
most help to imperiled species. There is little to be gained for the FWS or for
climate-threatened species by having the agency go down this road. The
agency has no explicit authority to do so, does not have the expertise to do so,
and would risk undermining the political viability of the ESA by doing so.
Rather, the FWS can provide expert assistance to the agencies more
appropriately charged with regulating greenhouse gas emissions, such as the
EPA, by advising them about the effects of climate change on species.
233
As for its direct role in addressing climate change, the FWS can employ the
ESA most effectively by identifying species threatened by climate change,
identifying which of those can be helped through the ESA's habitat-based
programs, and devising a management plan - one that uses regulatory action as
well as recovery planning - to build each such species its bridge. Indeed, this
strategy allows the FWS to dispense with the distinction between human-
232 There is strong evidence that almost every flow system in nature, from Earth's jet
streams to Jupiter's banded winds, responds to disturbances by moving toward self-
organized order. See Richard A. Kerr, Order from Chaos, Power from Dissipation in
Planetary Flows, 317 SCIENCE 449, 449 (2007).
233 For example, federal agencies required to prepare environmental impact statements
under the National Environmental Policy Act in connection with projects they carry out,
fund, or authorize must "[o]btain the comments of any Federal agency which has ... special
expertise with respect to any environmental impact involved." 40 C.F.R. § 1503.1(a)(1)
(2007).
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induced and natural climate variation. Climate change is climate change - it
does not matter to the species what is causing it. What does matter to them is
whether and in what shape they survive it.
This brings us to the six policy choice pressure points raised in Part II. To
implement the proposed bridge policy, I suggest the FWS approach the policy
choices as follows:
Identifying Climate-Threatened Species. The agency's objective should be
to use the ESA to define and monitor the ecological reshuffling effects of
climate change. The agency should aggressively identify species threatened by
climate change. Early identification of species threatened by climate change
and of the critical habitat they require for survival through climate change
transition will help in defining the extent of ecological reshuffling and guide
human adaptation programs. Early identification also will provide the basis for
listing species as threatened, which provides more flexibility in terms of
regulatory effects and recovery efforts.
Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions. The agency's objective should be
to not squander agency resources in a futile effort for which the ESA is simply
not equipped. The FWS should not attempt to use its Section 7 and Section 9
regulatory programs in an effort to regulate greenhouse gas emissions. As for
the take prohibition, listing species as threatened early will allow the agency to
remove greenhouse gas emissions from consideration under Section 9 while
keeping the take prohibition active with respect to other contributing threats. If
an animal species is in endangered status, meaning Section 9 necessarily
applies in full force, difficulties in establishing the burden of proof would
support the exercise of prosecutorial discretion not to attempt to regulate
greenhouse gas emissions. Under the Section 7 consultation program, project-
specific jeopardy analyses should promote other federal agencies to consider
ways of reducing greenhouse gas emissions, but should not lead to jeopardy
findings.
Regulating Non-Climate Effects To Protect Climate-Threatened Species.
The agency's objective should be to support the bridge function of the ESA
and to reduce the adverse impacts on species from human adaptation to climate
change. Where a species weakened by climate change is also threatened by
other anthropogenic sources, such as loss of habitat, and where the agency
reasonably believes addressing the non-climate threats will help carry the
species through the climate change transition, the agency should use Section 7
and Section 9 regulatory powers to the extent necessary. In particular, where
human adaptation to climate change exacerbates threats to a species, the
agency should aggressively employ its regulatory presence through Section 7
consultations and enforcement of the Section 9 take prohibition. The agency
also must monitor the impacts of human adaptation on species that face no
direct or secondary ecological threat from climate change and employ Section
7 and Section 9 powers accordingly. Clearly, however, innovative approaches
will be needed, such as market-based incentives and regional planning efforts,
to facilitate human adaptation measures as much as species can tolerate.
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Designing Conservation and Recovery Initiatives. The agency's objective
should be to get as many species with a long-term chance at survival and
recovery through the transition to the other side of climate change as is
realistically possible. The agency must initially differentiate between species
that are unlikely to survive climate change under any circumstances and those
that are likely to benefit from assistance in their home ecosystems. Agency
resources should not be wasted in developing recovery plans or other
conservation measures for non-recoverable species. For species that appear
likely to withstand climate change under the ESA's protection, recovery plans
should identify the expected intensity of assistance required to manage or
respond to primary and secondary ecological effects. Conservation measures
for species that require intensive assistance, particularly in Section 10 HCPs,
should be designed around adaptive management techniques that involve
ample monitoring and considerable room for adjustment of management
actions in order to account for the possibility that continuing climate change
will alter the effectiveness of those actions.
Species Trade-Offs. The agency's objective should be to not contribute to
ecological reshuffling through its species management efforts. Where the
measures described above are complicated by species trade-offs - when
helping one may harm another - the agency should adopt an ecosystem-based
management approach modeled on promoting long-term species diversity and
ecosystem multi-functionality. 234 When ecological models do not point to a
particular management action to serve those goals, general default priorities,
such as assisting top-level predators and resisting induced invasions, may help
mediate between species in conflict.
Dealing with the Doomed. The agency's objective should be to avoid
accelerating the decline of species who stand no chance of surviving climate
change, but not to take measures on their behalf which could pose threats to
other species. Under this standard, assisted migration should be employed for
such a species only if the FWS has assembled conclusive evidence of the
extinction threat, a quantitative model showing the likely success of assisted
migration for the species with de minimis anticipated effects on other species,
and an assisted migration management plan including long term monitoring
and active adaptive management. 235 Human adaptation measures that could
accelerate the extinction of the species, which could cascade to affect other
234 Maximizing biodiversity will assist the ecosystems of the future, whatever pattern
they assume, in establishing and maintaining resilience. See Andy Hector & Robert Bagchi,
Biodiversity and Ecosystem Multifunctionality, 448 NATURE 188, 188 (2007).
235 This approach is what McLachlan et al. refer to as "constrained assisted migration,"
as opposed to aggressive use of assisted migration at one extreme and total prohibition of
the practice at the other extreme. See Jason S. McLachlan et al., A Framework for Debate
of Assisted Migration in an Era of Climate Change, 21 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 297, 299
(2007).
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species, should be regulated under Section 7 and Section 9 as for any other
listed species.
CONCLUSION
The "pit-bull" has met its match, but sometimes old dogs can learn new
tricks. It is sobering to find that ecological reshuffling is inevitable and to
realize that the ESA can't do anything about it. Yet this is precisely what leads
me to my proposal that the statute be employed in a more focused manner in
the decades leading to our no-analog future. What the statute has done best is
stop the decline of imperiled species brought under its protective wings, and it
has done so in the face of problems as intractable as urbanization and invasive
species. The ESA has not solved urban sprawl or invasive species - it has
helped species deal with them. Likewise, we must find a way for the ESA to
help species deal with the effects of climate change, not its causes. The statute
provides this flexibility - the means to proactively identify the threat of climate
change and focus on helping those species that can be helped.
My proposal is unlikely to satisfy strong supporters of the ESA or its strong
critics. The former are likely to believe the "pit bull" has found its ultimate
calling in climate change. If there is any statute that can wrestle greenhouse
gas emissions to the ground (i.e., to 1990 levels), they might think it is the ESA
and its unrelenting biocentric mission, whereas my proposal keeps the statute
at bay. The latter will object to my proposal's aggressive call for species
listings, which is based on wholesale adoption of the premise of human-
induced climate change, and to its continued use of the statute as a regulatory
weapon against habitat loss and other non-climate threats to climate-threatened
species.
Both views doom the ESA. Of course, that may be the intent and hope of
the statute's critics, with or without climate change. But adopting the strong
version of the ESA in the climate change era, in which the FWS charges hard
after greenhouse gas emissions, would play right into the critics' hands - the
statute is neither designed to regulate something so ubiquitous as greenhouse
gas emissions nor so sacrosanct as to survive the political battle attempting to
do so would ignite. Support for the ESA, therefore, must be tempered by
practical and political reality if the ESA itself is to survive climate change.
The trade-off I propose - standing back from greenhouse gas emissions but
staying fully engaged in regulating non-climate threats, particularly those
stemming from human adaptation to climate change - is the plan the ESA
needs in order to build the bridge for species into the no-analog future.
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